Essays in asset pricing with anticipative information by Truong, Thu
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2015
Essays in asset pricing with
anticipative information
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/13317
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
QUESTROM SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
Dissertation
ESSAYS IN ASSET PRICING WITH ANTICIPATIVE
INFORMATION
by
THU TRUONG
B.Sc., McGill University, 2010
Submitted in partial fulllment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2015
c 2015 by
THU TRUONG
All rights reserved except for chap-
ter 3, which is c 2015 by Jerome
Detemple, Marcel Rindisbacher
and Thu Truong.
Approved by
First Reader
Jérôme Detemple, PhD
Professor of Finance
Everett W. Lord Distinguished Faculty Scholar
Second Reader
Marcel Rindisbacher, PhD
Associate Professor of Finance
Third Reader
Rodolfo Prieto, PhD
Assistant Professor of Finance
Acknowledgments
I would never have been able to nish my dissertation without the guidance of my
committee members, help from professors and friends, and support from my family.
First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor,
Professor Jérôme Detemple, for his excellent guidance, caring, patience, and invalu-
able insights throughout all the stages of researching and writing this thesis. It has
been an honor and a privilege to be his student, and to learn from him. He provided
unreserved support during my PhD, patiently corrected my writing and generously
paved the way for my development as a researcher. Describing him as my teacher,
thesis advisor , or co-author does not do justice to the central role he played in my
development. There are no words to describe my intellectual and personal debt to
him.
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Marcel Rindisbacher
who o¤ered me with tremendous support, thoughtful advice and wisdom in my re-
search. He suggested me to read many papers, references and gave me many great
comments to shape my research direction and perfect my thesis. It has been a great
pleasure learning from him.
I am very grateful to Professor Roldofo Prieto for spending so much time in
guiding me to do research work and helping me to develop strong background in
nancial economics.
I would like to thank all the professors in the Mathematical Finance Program
- Andrew Lyaso¤, Ahmad Namini, Paolo Guasoni, and Michael Nowotny - who all
helped to lay the foundation and to give me the tools to succeed.
In addition, I would like to thank all Finance Faculty in the Boston University
Brownbag seminar who provided helpful comments and advice on my research papers.
iv
I would further like to acknowledge the nancial support of the Questrom School
of Business - Boston University and the Department of Mathematical Finance.
Finally, I want to thank my family because without their love, support and en-
couragement this journey would not have been possible. Specically I would like to
thank my parents Thu Bach and Kiet Truong for always and unconditionally stand-
ing by the choices I have made in my life, my sister Vien Truong for teaching me the
value of patience, my brother Phong Truong, for cheering me up through the good
times and bad.
v
ESSAYS IN ASSET PRICING WITH ANTICIPATIVE
INFORMATION
THU TRUONG
Boston University, Questrom School of Business, 2015
Major Professor: Jerome Detemple, PhD ,
Professor of Finance
Everett W. Lord Distinguished Faculty Scholar
ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on private information dissemination and its impacts on nan-
cial markets. Specically, we study issues arising when there are skilled individuals
able to extract anticipative information about future prices. The rst model considers
a continuous time economy that is populated by informed and uninformed investors
as well as active unskilled investors, and investigates the existence of noisy rational
expectations equilibria and their properties. Equilibria are derived in closed form and
their properties analyzed. Informed trading is found to reduce price volatility. The
second model is based on the idea that besides exploiting their private information for
trading purposes, informed agents might want to o¤er wealth management services
to uninformed investors in exchange for a fee. A market for active funds emerges, and
the process of anticipative information dissemination is endogenized. In this chapter,
heterogenous risk averse investors can invest in the active fund. Low risk tolerance
investors are found to be strictly better o¤ with the active fund. Fund size is not a
reliable indicator of managerial skill. The market reacts to the managers increasing
risk-taking behavior by reducing the volatility and risk premium.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Information is a key element in the decision making process of all the market
participants, especially in an economy where some agents have private information
and some do not. The ones who have private information try to take advantage of
it, but at the same time want to hide this valuable information from other market
participants. The uninformed agents will wish to obtain that private information.
By trading in the nancial market, the private information is partly disseminated to
the public. Therefore, an analysis of information dissemination is very important to
understand the nancial marketsbehaviors.
This thesis focuses on private information dissemination and its impacts on nan-
cial markets. Specically, we study issues arising when there are skilled individuals
able to extract anticipative information about future prices or dividends. There are
two models in this thesis: each model studies an economy and derives the correspond-
ing asset pricing implications. The rst model considers a continuous time economy
that is populated by informed and uninformed investors as well as active unskilled
investors and investigates the existence of noisy rational expectations equilibria, prop-
erties of equilibrium prices and welfare. The second model is based on the idea that
besides exploiting their private information for trading purposes, informed agents
might want to o¤er wealth management services to uninformed investors in exchange
for a fee. A market for active funds emerges, and the process of anticipative infor-
2mation dissemination is endogenized. This second model predicts the non-monotonic
relationship between fund size and managerial skill.
In the rst model, the amount of private information disseminated to the market
is xed by the fraction of informed investors in the economy. Therefore, the roles
of information in the market can be studied in detail. More precisely, private infor-
mation circulated in the market can have two opposite e¤ects. On the one hand, a
more informative nancial market seems desirable because it transmits more valuable
information to uninformed investors and therefore helps to improve the allocation of
resources. On the other hand, informed trading is inherently unfair because those
with private information have an ultimate advantage, and thus informed trading
could reduce participation, leading to a decrease in liquidity (i.e. an adverse selection
e¤ect).
This chapter examines issues surrounding the informational and allocational ef-
ciency of the nancial market, in a dynamic framework with private information
about future dividends. Competitive dynamic equilibria are derived in closed form.
Therefore, the behaviors of the equilibrium price and its volatility, and the risk pre-
mium properties can be studied in detail.
First, in competitive equilibria, it can be shown that weak form e¢ ciency fails
because the price is not a su¢ cient statistic for public information. The public infor-
mation comprises both the stock price and the news on dividends.
Second, private information trading is found to stabilize the market. In fact, this
private anticipative information is most valuable at the initial date. In the early
stages of the economy, the price is heavily inuenced by this initial information and,
for this reason, does not react signicantly to fundamental information. As soon as
the anticipative information is disseminated in the market, all market participants
learn more about the stock market evolution, so the market is more informationally
3e¢ cient. In particular, the stock price volatility is shown to decrease, relative to an
equilibrium without private information.
Next, as the learning of this private anticipative information and news on dividends
happens continuously, the stock markets behavior changes dynamically throughout
the investment horizon. Over time, fundamental information accumulates, reducing
the usefulness of the initial piece of information extracted. The impact of funda-
mental information on the stock price grows, thereby increasing the stocks volatility.
Therefore, the volatility of the stock price increases through the dividend cycle and
converges to the volatility of the fundamental as the dividend date approaches. Para-
doxically, fundamental information, which accumulates through the dividend cycle
and eventually announces the dividend payment, is the source of this risk increase.
Fourth, the price reactions to the underlying fundamental and to the endogenous
noisy signal revealed vary through the dividend cycle. The Sharpe ratio varies sto-
chastically through the dividend cycle. Its volatility also increases over time. Hence,
the covariance between the change in the stock price and the change in the Sharpe
ratio increases within a dividend cycle.
The second model extends the rst model by endogenizing the dissemination
process of private information. Specically, the chapter develops a theoretical model
where investors have di¤erent risk aversions to portfolio wealth uctuations. The
nancial market is populated by a representative informed investor (the fund man-
ager), uninformed investors (also referred to as public investors) and a representative
noise trader. The informed investor receives a signal about the future stock price
and o¤ers investment management services to the uninformed investors. Heterogene-
ity in the uninformed investorsrisk tolerances splits the public population into two
groups, the ones with low risk tolerances optimally invest in the actively managed
funds whereas the ones with high risk tolerances self-manage their portfolios (i.e. an
4adverse selection e¤ect). This segmentation in the public population endogenizes the
information dissemination process and e¤ectively a¤ects the equilibrium asset price.
Asset pricing implications are revisited.
Moreover, in a general equilibrium setting, it is found that the fund managers skill
and the fund size are not correlated. The relationship between the two is a double
hump shaped curve. Indeed, an increase in managerial skill a¤ects directly the private
information precision, and indirectly the price informativeness and the economys
overall risk tolerance. An investor who knows that the manager now has higher skill
has two options: he either invests in the active fund or self-manages his wealth. What
happens is as follows. First, an increase in managerial skill immediately increases the
private information precision and the price informativeness. However, the investors
do not just evaluate the immediate benets of the private information precision and
the price informativeness but also take into account the herding behaviors of their
peers. Some investors are herding; the ow is in the direction such that the marginal
benet of investing in the active fund is equal to the marginal cost of forgoing the
public signal. Therefore, the equilibrium fund size is determined by the collective
actions of all agents.
In fact, there are three forces simultaneously interacting in response to the man-
agers higher skill: private information precision, price informativeness and overall
risk tolerance of the economy. The private information precision has a positive ef-
fect on the equilibrium fund size. The price informativeness, on the contrary, has
a negative e¤ect on the fund size because some of the investors are better o¤ using
the endogenous public signal instead of paying the fund manager some fee. Since the
investorsrisk tolerances have non-linear e¤ects on the equilibrium risky asset prices,
the risk tolerance e¤ect (i.e. herding direction) is ambiguous. This result di¤eren-
tiates the actively managed fund sector from other industries whose sizes increase if
5the managersskills increase. It implies that fund size is not a reliable indicator of
managerial skill.
In addition, the market reacts to the managers increasing risk-taking behavior by
reducing the market price of risk, volatility and risk premium. The market price of
risk decreases because more uninformed investors switch to the active fund and only
the very high risk tolerance ones self-manage their portfolios. The high average risk
tolerances of the remaining public investors implies that they are able to absorb more
market risk and this leads to a decrease in the market price of risk. The decrease
in volatility is the consequence of an increase in price informativeness.1 Because
both market prices of risk and volatility decrease in response to an increase in the
managers risk taking level, the risk premium, which is a product of the market price
of risk and the volatility, decreases accordingly.
Furthermore, the asymmetric information creates an automatic mechanism for
public investors to protect themselves against the manager taking on excessive risk.
In fact, the distribution of risk tolerances among public investors coupled with adverse
selection set limits on the fund managers risk-taking levels. The managers cannot
implement a strategy that is excessively risky or very conservative, otherwise no one
would want to invest in active funds. In particular, the distribution of risk tolerances
sets investorsdesired levels of the expected returns relative to the market return. On
the other hand, the adverse selection induces a lower market risk premium and lower
volatility if fund managers take on more risk. The combination of these elements
curbs the fund managers risk-taking incentives. If fund managers follow an extreme
conservative strategy giving investors a lower expected return than they could earn
from the market return by self-managing their wealth, then the active funds collapse.
1As in Detemple, Rindisbacher & Truong (2014), where anticipative information stabilizes the
stock market, an increase in price informativeness necessarily induces a decrease in equilibrium
volatility.
6By taking on more risk, managers can only increase fund size up to a certain extent.
The reason is that when the active fund attracts enough uninformed investors, the
market reacts by substantially lowering volatility and risk premium, so taking on more
risk just reduces signicantly the price of risk of the asset and makes the risky asset
less attractive to hold, and this action is suboptimal to fund managers. Moreover, a
more polarized distribution curbs the fund size. Because an increase in risk-taking
level does not signicantly change the average risk tolerance of the remaining public
investors, the market reacts solely because of the managers risk-taking behavior, and
thus taking more risk is no longer e¤ective.
7Chapter 2
Literature Review
Classical studies pertaining to informational e¢ ciency are based on static models.
Seminal articles, identifying the determinants of e¢ ciency in competitive markets, are
those of Grossman (1976, 1978) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). They demonstrate
the possibility, as well as the limits, of informationally e¢ cient markets. Issues related
to non-competitive behavior are examined by Hellwig (1980), Kyle (1989), Black
(1992), and Leland (1992). Hellwig (1980) argues that informed investors who are
aware of their price impact should not behave competitively. It resolves this apparent
inconsistency, dubbed the schizophreniaproblem, by showing that agents can no
longer a¤ect the price, in the limit competitive equilibrium, as the number of informed
investors becomes large. Kyle (1989) and Black (1992) consider informed investors
who explicitly account for the impact of their demands on the equilibrium price. It
shows that imperfect competition resolves the schizophrenia problem. It also nds
that prices are less informative with imperfect competition. Leland (1992) focuses
more specically on insider trading and on properties of equilibrium in a static model
with production and monopolistic insider behavior. Among other results, it nds that
private information trading increases the average stock price, decreases the stock
returns expectation and variance for the uninformed, reduces the liquidity of the
market and can increase or decrease welfare.
Dynamic models with asymmetric information and competitive behavior were pi-
oneered by Kyle (1989), Black (1992), Wang (1993, 1994). In Wang (1993, 1994),
8the stock is an innitely-lived asset that pays dividends continuously through time.
Informed investors observe the state variable driving the expected future dividend.
Uninformed investors do not, but they learn through dividends and prices. Noise
trading injects supply uncertainty and prevents full revelation. Wang (1993) derives
a competitive noisy rational expectations equilibrium (NREE). This equilibrium is
stationary as the coe¢ cients of the price process are constant. Asymmetric infor-
mation is shown to increase the stocks long run risk premium. It can also increase
the price volatility and enhance negative serial correlation. Asymmetric information
can therefore have a destabilizing e¤ect. Wang (1994) focuses on issues pertaining
to the volume of trade in a similar, but not identical, setting. The article highlights
the relation between volume and price changes. Wang (1995) study an economy
with nite horizon and e¤ects on trading volume. The e¤ects of imperfect competi-
tion and asymmetric information on the dynamic properties of prices and liquidity
are examined in Vayanos and Wang (2012). Their analysis is cast in a model with
three periods. They show, in particular, that asymmetric information and imperfect
competition can have opposite e¤ects on ex-ante expected returns.1
Albuquerque and Miao (2014) extend the competitive model of Wang (1994) by
allowing for private advance information about future dividends. They also allow
for a private investment opportunity. In their model, time is discrete and advance
information pertains to the temporary component of the dividend paid at the next
date. Agents derive utility over next period wealth. They solve for the stationary
equilibrium by conjecturing a state space and a pricing rule. The stationary solution
1A vast microstructure literature also deals with non-competitive informed trading. Fundamental
contributions are in Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In these models, risk neutral
market makers extract private information from the aggregate order ow and set the price so as to
break even on average. This pricing rule does not account for the endogenous interactions between
risk, price appreciation and price level. The absence of diversication benets implies that trading is
purely informational. Moreover, the price evolution is typically determined by the exogenous noise
trading behavior and is locally orthogonal to fundamental risk.
9is obtained up to a system of non-linear equations. The paper shows that good
advanced information increases the stock price and the risk premium. It also shows
that informed (resp. uninformed) investors behave as trend chasers (resp. contrarian).
The model developed in the third chapter of this thesis builds on both Wang
(1993, 1994) and Albuquerque and Miao (2014). It di¤ers in several respects. The
rst di¤erence is that the analysis is not restricted to stationary equilibria. Compet-
itive non-stationary equilibria are derived and studied. The second is that equilibria
are obtained in closed form. All coe¢ cients are explicit functions of time, reecting
the time left to the next dividend payment date. Strong timing e¤ects are identied.
The third di¤erence is that a new solution method is introduced. The approach relies
on the construction of the private information price of risk (PIPR) in the equilib-
rium under consideration.2 The PIPR isolates the e¤ects of private information. Its
properties hint at the structure of equilibrium and can be used to formulate natural
conjectures about the informational content of the stock price. The fourth di¤erence
is the nature of private information that pertains to the dividend level at the fu-
ture payment date and is therefore long-lived. More precisely, information has value
throughout a dividend cycle and will be used continuously for trading. The value of
information, reected in the PIPR, nevertheless changes in light of fundamental news
that accumulate.
Another di¤erence with the literature is that noise trading takes a more elabo-
rate form in our setting. Noise traders are utility maximizing agents with bounded
rationality. They hold correct beliefs conditional on the realization of the signal,
but evaluate these beliefs based on unfounded rumors as opposed to factual private
information. They can be viewed as unskilled active traders. Ultimately, their op-
timal demand behavior mimics the demand behavior of the informed, but based on
2The notion of PIPR is introduced in Detemple and Rindisbacher (2013) in the context of a
portfolio selection problem with private information.
10
conditional beliefs evaluated at irrelevant noise. The behavioral noise trading model
postulated enables us to endogenize the noise trading demand function and conduct a
meaningful welfare analysis. The dynamic welfare results obtained extend the static
analysis in Leland (1992).
The fourth chapter extends the third chapter by studying simultaneously two
asymmetric information problems in a dynamic general equilibrium context, the rst
is the problem of asymmetric information about the future stock price and the second
arises when the fund manager does not know the uninformed investorscharacteristics
(i.e. risk tolerance in this model).3 The existing literature ignores the heterogeneity
in the uninformed investorscharacteristics, and consequently the adverse selection
in the market for actively managed funds. Hence, existing theoretical models cannot
explain why, in reality, the active funds playing a substantive role in the nancial
markets attract a lot of investors. This model shows that the low risk tolerance
investors are strictly better o¤ with an active fund, regardless of its performance and
suggests that in practice they should consider investing in the active funds.
Detemple and Rindisbacher (2013) shows that high risk tolerance investors prefer
skilled funds over unskilled funds. In fact, the investors in this paper have two exclus-
tive investment opportunities: skilled funds and unskilled funds while the investors in
my thesis have two options: investing in an actively managed fund or self-managing
their wealth. It would be interesting to consider a model where investors can choose
between active funds, passive funds as well as their self-managed investment accounts.
Given the importance of the actively managed fund industry, many studies focus
on delegated portfolio management. Existing theoretical research has focused pri-
marily on partial equilibrium settings, particularly the agency relationship and the
3This type asymmetric information raises adverse selection problem in the active fund market.
Adverse Selection is rst studied by Akerlof (1970)
11
search for the optimal compensation contract. This literature includes Bhattacharya
and Peiderer (1985), Starks (1987), Stoughton (1993), Ou-Yang (2003), Grinblatt
and Titman (1989), Carpenter (2000), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007). While it
is true that the fund managers investment strategy is unobservable to the investor,
the principal-agent problem is not quite applicable to the delegated portfolio man-
agement context because fund managers with market timing skill are rare, while the
number of uninformed public investors is enormous. Therefore, fund managers should
have more bargaining power over setting a contract. Moreover, in practice, the in-
vestment management fee is set by the fund manager, not by the investors. The
search for optimal contracts belongs to the normative theory rather than the positive
theory of the economics of portfolio delegation. So do the asset pricing models with
the agency relationship theme, Allen (2001), Brennan (1993), Gómez and Zapatero
(2003), Cornell and Roll (2005), and the general equilibrium analyses of portfolio
delegation in dynamic settings: Kapur and Timmermann (2005), Arora, Ju and Ou-
Yang (2006), Cuoco and Kaniel (2011). For that reason, this fourth chapter focuses
on the determination of the optimal fee set by the fund manager in both partial and
general equilibrium settings. The introduction of proportional fee structure and ad-
verse selection problem in the market for active funds is an attempt to contribute to
the positive theory of the economics of portfolio delegation.
Another strand of related literature is the theory of the size distribution of business
rms suggested by Manne (1965) and then developed by Lucas (1978) who concluded
that talented managers acquire more productive factors, expanding the size of the
rm. Berk and Green (2004) set up a model based on this relationship. However, the
fourth chapter shows that the actively managed fund industry has a distinct feature
from other industries: the size of this sector is not monotonically increasing in the
fund manager skill level. An immediate implication is that the fund size might not
12
be a credible indicator to identify a truly skilled fund manager.
13
Chapter 3
Dynamic Noisy Rational Expectations
Equilibria with Anticipative Information
This chapter develops a competitive equilibrium model with endogenous asymmetric
information. The economy is presented in Section 3.1 and the equilibrium structure
is studied in Section 3.2.
3.1 The Economy
3.1.1 Assets and Markets
There are two types of assets in the economy, a riskless asset and a risky stock. The
riskless asset is a money market account paying interest at the instantaneous rate
r. In the absence of intertemporal consumption, which will be assumed, the interest
rate can be set at zero (r = 0). The risky stock pays a liquidating dividend DT at
the terminal date T . The dividend payment is the terminal value of the process,
dDt = 
Ddt+ DdWDt , t 2 [0; T ]
where D is a constant drift coe¢ cient and D is a constant and positive volatility
coe¢ cient. WD is a Brownian motion process with ltration FD(), dened on a prob-
ability space
 

;FD; P. The process D can be viewed as a fundamental factor that
eventually determines the terminal dividend.
The stock trades at an endogenously determined price S. Trading takes place in
14
continuous time. There are no restrictions on stock holdings or borrowing.
3.1.2 Agents, Noise and Information Signal
Three groups of investors operate in the nancial market, informed, uninformed and
noise traders. The respective fractions of the three groups in the population are !i; !u
and !n, with !i + !u + !n = 1. Each group is treated as a homogeneous entity with
a representative individual.
The (representative) informed investor is a skilled individual, able to extract infor-
mation about the future stock payo¤DT . Information extraction is carried out at the
initial date t = 0 and generates the noisy signal G = DT+ , where   N

0;
 

2
.
Skill is measured by the precision v =
 

 2
of the signal. When
 

2
increases,
precision falls and the informational content of the signal decreases. Thus, skill de-
creases. In the limit, when
 

2 ! 1, the signal becomes pure noise and skill
vanishes. The informedinvestor e¤ectively becomes unskilled (uninformed).
The uninformed investor does not have extraction ability. He/she observes prices
and other quantities that are in the public information set. Let Fm() be the public
information ltration.
The noise trader is a mimicking agent. He/she tries to emulate the demand
behavior of the informed agent, but on the basis of irrelevant noise as opposed to
factual private information. The noise traders demand depends on an independent
random variable . A precise description is provided below.
3.1.3 Stock Price and Information Sets
The opportunity set of investors depends on the stock price structure. In this en-
vironment, there are two sources of uncertainty, WD associated with fundamental
information and  with noise trading behavior. Standard arguments can be invoked
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to write any candidate price process as,
dSt = 
S
t dt+ 
S
t dW
S
t ; ST = DT : (3.1)
In this structureW S is a Brownian motion relative to the public information ltration
Fm(). It is endogenous and, ultimately, relates to the underlying source of fundamental
uncertainty WD. The coe¢ cients
 
S; S

of the price process are also endogenous
and adapted to Fm(). The uninformed observes the stock price, hence can retrieve
the volatility coe¢ cient from its quadratic variation. The Brownian motion dW St = 
St
 1  
dSt   St dt

is an innovation process in their ltration. The information
ltration FS() generated by S is in the public information ow Fm(). That is, FS()  Fm().
The information set of the informed is augmented by the private signal G. Private
information is carried by the enlarged ltration FG()  Fm() _  (G). As private infor-
mation modies the perception of the risk-reward trade-o¤, the fundamental source
of risk WD is no longer Brownian motion relative to the enlarged ltration. Instead,
the translated process,
dWGt = dW
S
t   Gjmt (G) dt where Gjmt (G) dt  E

dW St
FGt 
becomes a Brownian motion. The translation factor Gjmt (G) is the private infor-
mation price of risk (PIPR), which is a function of the private signal G.1 Relative
to private information, the stock price evolution is dSt =

St + 
S
t 
Gjm
t (G)

dt+
St dW
G
t . The superior information is reected in the private information premium
St 
Gjm
t (G). Given that public information Fm() is endogenous, the private information
premium is endogenous as well.
1The PIPR is invariant with respect to strictly monotonic transformations of G. Indeed, the
private information generated by G coincides with the information generated by G = h (G), if h ()
is strictly monotone. The PIPR for G is Gjmt
 
h 1 (G)

= 
Gjm
t (G). As any signal with a strictly
monotonic continuous distribution is a strictly monotonic transformation of a Gaussian signal, the
equilibrium analysis in this paper applies for signals of this type.
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3.1.4 Informed and Uninformed Preferences and Optimal Stock Demands
Throughout the chapter, superscripts i and u are used to distinguish the informed (i)
from the uninformed (u) investor. Let Xjt denote the wealth of investor j at time t,
j 2 fi; ug. Conditional preferences have the mean-variance structure,
U j  F j0 =
8><>: E
h
X iT   12 
R T
0
d [X i]s
FG0 i for j = i
E
h
XuT   12 
R T
0
d [Xu]s
Fm0 i for j = u (3.2)
where [X] denotes the quadratic variation (realized variance) of X and   (resp. 1= )
is a common absolute risk tolerance (resp. risk aversion) parameter. Preferences of
the informed (resp. uninformed) are conditional on private (resp. public) informa-
tion. The conditional utility functional (3.2) shows that investors care about terminal
wealth XT , but also dislike the risk [X]T =
R T
0
d [X]s, i.e., the realized variance, as-
sociated with it. The utility function depends on these two attributes.2 Foundations
for multiattribute preferences are in Keeney and Rai¤a (1976). The ex-ante utility is
U j = E U j  F j0 where the expectation is taken relative to the information signals
in the sets F j0 ; j 2 fi; ug.
Investors maximize utility (3.2) subject to the dynamics of wealth,
dXjt =
8<: N
i
t

St + 
S
t 
Gjm
t (G)

dt+ St dW
G
t

for j = i
Nut
 
St dt+ 
S
t dW
S
t

for j = u
(3.3)
and the informational constraint mandating that N j be adapted to F j() for j 2 fi; ug.
The policy N j represents the number of shares held. Proposition 1 describes the
optimal demands.
Proposition 1 The optimal number of shares held by the informed and uninformed
2The preferences in (3.2) are linear in probabilities, hence time-consistent.
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investors are,
Nut =  
St
(St )
2 =  
St 
m
t
(St )
2 and N
i
t =  
St + 
S
t 
Gjm
t (G)
(St )
2 =  
St

mt + 
Gjm
t (G)

(St )
2
for t 2 [0; T ], where m is the price of risk for the uninformed. The informed holds
more (resp. less) shares than the uninformed if and only if the private information
premium St 
Gjm
t (G) is positive (resp. negative).
Optimal stock demands have a mean-variance structure. The di¤erence between
the two investors resides in their evaluation of the expected stock return. The in-
formed evaluates the return on the basis of private information as well as public
information. The resulting expected return has two components. The rst one,
St = 
S;D
t 
m
t , is the expected return based on public information. The second one,
St 
Gjm
t (G), is the additional premium calculated on the basis of private information.
This premium is a¢ ne in the PIPR Gjmt (G), i.e., the private information price of risk
(see Detemple and Rindisbacher (2013)). The PIPR is the incremental price of risk
assessed in light of information that is not revealed by public information sources.
It represents the private information price of risk conditional on public information.
Thus, the informed has an allocational demand,  mt =
S
t , and an informational de-
mand,  Gjmt (G) =
S
t . The uninformed has a pure allocational demand,  
m
t =
S
t .
3.1.5 Mimicking Noise Trading and Optimal Stock Demand
The noise trader is an agent with bounded rationality, who ultimately replicates
the demand of the informed, but without the benet of observing the private sig-
nal. Instead, this investor believes in rumors, blogs and other reports that are unre-
lated to fundamentals underlying the stock price. Specically, conditional beliefs are
dP n = anT () dP  exp
R T
0

Gjm
t () dW
S
t   12
R T
0

Gjm
t ()
2 dt

dP where  is the re-
alization of an independent, normally distributed random variable with mean  and
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variance
 

2
. The function anT () is a beliefs distortion capturing the departure
from rationality, conditional on the realization . It corresponds to the density of the
private signal, anT () =
P (G2dxjFmT )
P (G2dxjFm0 ) jx=
, but evaluated at the noise . The informed
has the same beliefs distortion, but evaluated at the private signal G. The noise
traders information is the public information ltration Fm().
The noise trader conditional preferences are Un () = En
h
XnT   12 
R T
0
d [Xn]s
Fm0 i
where the expectation is under the beliefs P n,   is an absolute risk tolerance para-
meter and wealth satises dXnt = N
n
t
 
St dt+ 
S
t dW
S
t

. Equivalently, conditional
preferences can be written as Un () = E
h
XnT   12 
R T
0
d [Xn]s
FG0 ijG= where the
expectation is under P and information is FG0 = Fm0 _  (G) evaluated at G = . In
the beliefs P n (resp. information FG0 evaluated at ) the stock price evolves according
to dSt =

St + 
S
t 
Gjm
t ()

dt + St dW

t where W
 is a P n-Brownian motion (resp.
FGjG=0 -Brownian motion). The stock price of risk is believed to be t  mt +Gjmt ().
Ex-ante utility is Un = E [Un ()] where the expectation is over the random variable
.
Proposition 2 The optimal number of shares held by the noise trader is,
Nnt =  
St

mt + 
Gjm
t ()

(St )
2 (3.4)
for t 2 [0; T ], where m is the uninformed price of risk and Gjmt () is a speculative
premium/discount reecting the departure from rationality. The noise trader holds
more (resp. less) shares than the uninformed if and only if the speculative premium
St 
Gjm
t () is positive (resp. negative).
The optimal noise trading demand has two parts. The rst part,  mt =
S
t , is the
usual mean-variance demand of an uninformed rational agent. This part reects an
allocational trading motive. The second part,  Gjmt () =
S
t , is a speculative demand
associated with an informational signal consisting of pure noise. In the end, the noise
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trader demand mimics the demand of the informed. It e¤ectively corresponds to the
demand of an investor with randomized beliefs, i.e., an unskilled active investor.
Remark 3 The combined demand of the informed and the noise trader, called the
complementary demand, is,
Nt  !iN it + !nNnt =  
!St + 
S
t

!i
Gjm
t (G) + !
n
Gjm
t ()

(St )
2
where ! = !i +!n. The complementary demand is an a¢ ne function of the weighted
average price of risk (WAPR) t (G; ;!i; !n)  !iGjmt (G) + !nGjmt (). If the
PIPR is also an a¢ ne function, the complementary demand depends on t (G; ;!i; !n)
= t (Z;!), which is a function of the signal Z  !iG+ !n and is parametrized by
the combined population weight ! = !i + !n.
3.1.6 Equilibrium
A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) for the economy under consideration is a
triplet of demands (Nu; N i; Nn) and a price process dSt = St dt +
S
t dW
S
t ; ST = DT ,
such that (i) Individual rationality: N j is optimal for agent j 2 fu; i; ng, and (ii)
Market clearing: !uNu + !iN i + !nNn = 1.
The REE is noisy (NREE) if the informed and uninformed ltrations di¤er, Fu() 
F i(). The equilibrium is a competitive NREE if all agents take the price process
as given when expressing their optimal demands. It is a monopolistic NREE if the
informed agent takes the price impact of his/her trades into account when calculating
the optimal demand function.
3.2 Competitive Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium
The competitive NREE is described in Section 3.2.1. Properties of the PIPR and the
WAPR are examined in Section 3.2.2. Price and return properties are discussed in
Section 3.2.3. Properties of the market depth measure and stock holdings are outlined
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in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 Competitive Equilibrium Structure
In order to present the main result, dene the combined share of the informed and
the noise trader ! = !i + !n and the functions of time,
 (t) =
1  t!
H (t)
D;  (t) =  !1  t!
i
H (t)
D; t =
!iH (t)
M (t)
(3.5)
 (t) =  ! (1  t!
i)D (T   t)  !nt
H (t)
D;  (t; s) =
!i
 
D
2
(s  t)
M (t)
; s 2 [t; T ]
(3.6)
H (t) =
 
D
2
(T   t) +  2 ; M (t) =  !i2H (t) + (!n)2  2 : (3.7)
The function H (t) = V ar
 
GjFDt

is the conditional variance of the private signal
G given fundamental information at time t. The function M (t) = V ar
 
ZjFDt

is
the conditional variance of an endogenous signal Z  !iG + !n given fundamental
information at time t. The coe¢ cients t =
COV (G;ZjFDt )
V AR(ZjFDt )
and  (t; s) = COV (Ds;ZjF
D
t )
V AR(ZjFDt )
are regression coe¢ cients. The next proposition presents the NREE.
Proposition 4 A competitive NREE exists. The equilibrium stock price is,
St = A(t)Dt +B(t)Z + F (t) where Z = !iG+ !n (3.8)
and,
A (t) =

H (T )
H (t)
! 
M (T )
M (t)
1 !
(3.9)
B(t) =  (t; T ) + D
0@ TZ
t
A (s) ( (s) + (s)(t; s)) ds
1A (3.10)
F (t) = A (t)D (T   t) 
 
D
2
 
TZ
t
A (s)2 ds+D
TZ
t
A (s)  (s) ds !nI (t) (3.11)
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I (t) =  (t; T ) + D
TZ
t
A (s)  (s) (t; s) ds (3.12)
with (; ; ; ) as dened in (3.5)-(3.7). The coe¢ cients of the equilibrium stock
price process (3.1) are,
St =
 
St
2
 
  St t (Z;!) ; St = A (t)D (3.13)
t (Z;!) =  (t)Z +  (t)Dt +  (t) (3.14)
where t (Z;!)  !iGjmt (G) + !nGjmt () is the endogenous WAPR. Innovations in
the uninformed ltration are dW St = dW
D
t   Djmt dt with,

Djm
t =
E

dWDt jFmt

dt
=
!iD
M (t)
 
Z   !i  Dt + D (T   t)  !n : (3.15)
The evolution of the stock price in the public information is given by (3.1) where W S
is an Fm() = FD;Z() -Brownian motion.
The competitive equilibrium price in (3.8) is an a¢ ne function of the fundamental
D and of the random variable Z. This random variable is a noisy translation of the
private information signal G. It provides anticipative information about the terminal
dividend, but is less informative than the private signal. Both the price S and the
fundamental D are in the public information set Fm(). It follows that Z is publicly
observed as well. Thus, Z 2 Fm() and FD;Z()  FD;S()  Fm(). Conversely, the pair
(D;Z) reveals the price S, i.e., FS()  FD;Z() . Thus, FD;S() = FD;Z()  Fm().
In equilibrium, the uninformed extracts the noisy signal Z from the pair (D;S).
The uninformed also observes the complementary aggregate demand function !iN it +
!nNnt , described in Remark 3. At equilibrium, the complementary demand is also
a¢ ne in D and Z. If therefore fails to reveal any information beyond what is already
contained in (D;S). In the end, the equilibrium public information set consists of
the pair (D;Z). That is, FD;S() = FD;Z() = Fm(). The equilibrium uninformed ltration
22
is Fu() = Fm() = FD;S() = FD;Z() . The equilibrium informed ltration is strictly more
informative, F i() = FG() = Fm() _  (G)  Fm() = Fu(). The equilibrium is a noisy
rational expectations equilibrium.
In this competitive NREE, the stock price St is not a su¢ cient statistic for public
information. In fact,  (St)  Fmt = FD;Zt , where the inclusion is strict. Weak
form e¢ ciency therefore fails. The pairs (D;Z) or (D;S) are needed to summarize
the public information set. Fundamental information plays a crucial role for the
evaluation of future opportunities and the determination of optimal demands.
Remark 5 (Limit economy with small informed) Consider the limit economy with an
innitesimal informed population (!i ! 0 and !u ! 1   !n). The limit equilibrium
is,
Ssit = A
si(t)Dt +B
si(t)Zsi + F si(t); Zsi = !n
S;sit =

S;sit
2
 
  S;sit sit
 
Zsi;!n

; S;sit = A
si (t)D
sit
 
Zsi;!n

= si (t)Zsi + si (t)Dt + 
si (t)
where
 
Asi; Bsi; F si; si; si; si

are dened in (2)-(4). The limit WAPR is sit (Z
si;!n)
= !n
Gjm;si
t (). Innovations in the uninformed ltration vanish dW
S
t = dW
D
t because

Djm
t ! 0 when !i ! 0. The limit equilibrium fails to reveal any private information.
If, in addition, there is no mimicking investor (!i; !n ! 0), the equilibrium collapses
to a no-trade equilibrium where,
Ssi;0t = Dt + 
D (T   t) 
 
D
2
 
(T   t) ; S;si;0t = D; S;si;0t =
 
D
2
 
:
Stock price volatilities in the economy of Proposition 4 and the two limit economies
rank as St < 
S;si
t < 
S;si;0
t = 
D for t < T . As the payment date approaches the
volatilities converge, limt!TSt = limt!T
S;si
t = limt!T
S;si;0
t = 
D. Informed trading
increases the informational e¢ ciency of the market. It also stabilizes the market by
reducing the stocks exposure to fundamental shocks and the associated price volatility.
Remark 6 (Limit economy with small uninformed) Consider the limit economy with
an innitesimal uninformed population (!i ! 1   !n and !u ! 0). The limit equi-
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librium is,
Ssut = A
su (t)Dt +B
su (t)Zsu + F su (t) ; Zsu = (1  !n)G+ !n
S;sut =

S;sut
2
 
  S;sut sut (Zsu; 1) ; S;sut = Asu (t)D
sut (Z
su; 1) = su (t)Zsu + su (t)Dt + 
su (t)
where the functions (Asu; Bsu; F su; su; su; su) are dened in (5)-(10). If, in addi-
tion, there is no mimicking investor (!i ! 1; (!u; !n)! 0), the equilibrium collapses
to a no-trade equilibrium where
Ssu;0t = A
su (t)Dt +B
su;0 (t)G+ F su;0 (t) ; Zsu = G
S;su;0t =

S;su;0t
2
 
; S;su;0t = 
S;su
t = A
su (t)D; sut (Z
su; 1) = 0
with (Asu; Bsu;0; F su;0) as dened in (11)-(12). The pair (D;Ssu;0), in the limit
economy, is fully revealing. Stock price volatilities in the three equilibria rank as
S;sut = 
S;su;0
t < 
S
t < 
D for t < T . As the payment date approaches, limt!T
S;su
t =
limt!T
S;su;0
t = limt!T
S
t = 
D. Equilibrium prices in economies with small unin-
formed (large informed) populations are less sensitive to fundamental shocks and have
lower volatility.
3.2.2 PIPR and WAPR Properties
To provide further insights about the structure of equilibrium, it is instructive to
start with the PIPR. The PIPR is the (negative of the) instantaneous volatility of the
growth rate of the conditional density of the private information signal given public
information. In equilibrium, with Fmt = FD;Zt ,

Gjm
t (G) = vol

dpGt (G)
pGt (x)

=
G  GjD;Zt

GjD;Z
t
2 vol GjD;Zt  = G  GjD;Zt

GjD;Z
t
2  1  t!iD:
In the model under consideration, given the linearity of the endogenous signal Z
revealed, the conditional density is normal. The conditional mean alone depends on
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the dividend. The conditional variance is a function of time. The PIPR therefore
reduces to the volatility of the conditional mean suitably normalized. It is a¢ ne
in the private signal. As noted in Remark 3, it follows that the WAPR becomes
t (G; ;!)  t (Z;!) and that the complementary demand is an a¢ ne function of
t (Z;!). The equilibrium risk premium inherits this a¢ ne structure. Moreover, the
equilibrium complementary demand, being a¢ ne in t (Z;!), also reveals the signal
Z = !iG+ !n.
The next corollary describes the behavior of the endogenous PIPR.
Corollary 7 The equilibrium PIPR is,

Gjm
t (G) =
G  GjD;Zt

GjD;Z
t
2  1  t!iD = 1 (t)G+ 2 (t)Z + 0 (t)Dt + 0 (t)
1 (t)  
D
H (t)
; 2 (t)   t
D
H (t)
=   !
iD
M (t)
; 0 (t) =
 (t)
!
; 0 (t) =
 (t)
!
where ! = !i + !n and  (t) ;  (t) are dened in (3.5)-(3.7). The coe¢ cients 1 (t) ;
2 (t) and  (t) are the sensitivities with respect to the private signal G, the endogenous
public signal Z and the fundamental Dt. The coe¢ cient  (t) is a translation factor.
The following properties hold,
(i) Sensitivity to information: 1 (t) > 0; 2 (t) < 0;  (t) < 0.
(ii) Dynamic behavior:
(ii-1) @1(t)
@t
> 0, @2(t)
@t
< 0, @(t)
@t
< 0
(ii-2) @(t)
@t
> 0 if and only if H (t) < H+ with H+ as dened in (13)-(15).
(iii) Population e¤ects (informed to noise trader ratio): Fix ! and let s = !i=!n
vary. Then,
(iii-1) @1(t)
@s
= 0, @(t)
@s
> 0
(iii-2) @2(t)
@s
> 0 if and only if H (t) > 2s+1
s2
 

2
(iii-3) @(t)
@s
> 0 if and only if 2s
 

2
D (T   t) >

 s2H (t) +  2.
(iv) Bias e¤ects: @1(t)
@
= @2(t)
@
= @(t)
@
= 0, @(t)
@
< 0.
The reaction of the equilibrium PIPR to news is intuitive. Indeed, a larger private
signal indicates a greater terminal dividend, thus provides more valuable information.
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In contrast public information, be it endogenous or exogenous, reduces the local value
of private information.
The evolution of these sensitivities over time is also intuitive. The reaction to
private information 1 (t) is tamed by the unconditional variance of the signal H (t) in
the denominator. Over time, the informed observes the fundamental and updates the
content of the private signal. E¤ectively, the residual private information is G Dt.
This residual signal becomes more informative over time, as uncertainty resolves,
thereby enhancing the value of information. For the same reason, the precision of
the endogenous public signal increases. This reduces the (negative) sensitivity of the
PIPR to the endogenous signal, which decreases the value of private information. The
reaction to fundamental information reects the same e¤ect. Its decrease contributes
to a further reduction in the value of information.
Population e¤ects can be traced to the informational content of the endogenous
public signal which depends on the relative fraction s of informed to noise trader.
When s increases, endogenous information becomes more precise. This decreases
both sensitivities,
2 (t)    t
H (t)
D =   !
i
M (t)
D =   1
!
1 + 1
s
H (t) + 1
s2
()2
D
0 (t)   
1  t!i
H (t)
D =  
1
s2
 

2
H (t)

H (t) + 1
s2
()2
D
(denominator e¤ects), which become more negative. At the same time, the covariance
between the endogenous signal and private information decreases (numerator e¤ect),
which increases the sensitivities. In the case of 2 (t), the second e¤ect dominates
under the condition stated. For 0 (t), it always dominates.
The impact of the bias is through the conditional mean of the private signal. A
higher bias increases the conditional mean, leading to a reduction in the PIPR.
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The WAPR is closely related to the PIPR and inherits most of its properties.
Corollary 8 The equilibrium WAPR is given by (3.14). The coe¢ cients  (t) and
 (t) are the sensitivities with respect to the endogenous public signal and the funda-
mental information. The coe¢ cient  (t) is a translation factor. The properties of
( (t) ;  (t)) are the same as those of (0 (t) ; 0 (t)) in Corollary 7. The behavior of
 (t) di¤ers in the following respects,
(i) Sensitivity to information:  (t) > 0 if and only if
 

2
> sH (t).
(ii) Dynamic behavior:  (t) increases with time if and only if 2t < 1=!
i!.
(iii) Population e¤ects:  (t) increases with s if and only if H (t) > 2s+1
s2
 

2
.
The behavior of  (t) = 1 (t) + 2 (t)! is more intricate because 1 (t) ; 2 (t)
have di¤erent, sometimes opposite properties. The evolution of  (t) over time is
especially noteworthy. If !i!20 < 1, the coe¢ cient increases over time. If !
i!20 > 1
and !i!2T < 1, it initially decreases, then increases. If !
i!20 > 1 and !
i!2T > 1, it
decreases throughout. The possibility of a U -shaped pattern reects conicting e¤ects
on 1 (t) and 2 (t). Under the conditions stated, the decrease in 2 (t) dominates
early on, then is overtaken by the increase in 1 (t). An illustration is in Figure 31.
The gure presents the dynamic behavior of  (t) for t 2 [0; T ]. Parameter values are
T = 1, D = 0:1,  = STD [G],  = 0:32. The weight of informed is !i = 1
2
. The
weight of mimicking noise traders varies between !n = 0:05 (left panel), !n = 0:22
(middle panel) and !n = 0:25 right panel.
3.2.3 Price and Return Properties
Fundamental information accumulates with the passage of time, providing more pre-
cise estimates of the next dividend payment. Information accumulation a¤ects the
properties of equilibrium. The next corollary describes the dynamic behavior of the
price and the return components.
Corollary 9 The stock price sensitivity to the fundamental (resp. the endogenous
public signal) increases (resp. decreases) over time. The volatility of the stock price,
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Figure 31: Sensitivity of WAPR to private information
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St = A (t)
D, increases over time. The minimal and maximal volatility values are
obtained at the initial and terminal dates,
S0 = A (0)
D =

H (T )
H (0)
! 
M (T )
M (0)
1 !
D; lim
t!T
St = A (T )
D = D:
The stocks price of risk St =
S
t = A (t)
D=    ( (t)Z +  (t)Dt +  (t)) becomes
more sensitive to the fundamental over time (i.e.,   (t) > 0 increases for all t 2
[0; T ]). Its sensitivity with respect to the endogenous public signal increases at date t
if and only if !i!2t < 1 (i.e.,   (t) increases if !i!2t < 1).
At the initial date, the uninformed extracts the noisy signal Z from the price.
This information is most valuable when there is no other source of information, i.e.,
at the initial date. In the early stages of the economy, the price is heavily inuenced
by this initial information and, for this reason, does not react signicantly to fun-
damental information. Over time, fundamental information accumulates, reducing
the usefulness of the initial piece of information extracted. The impact of fundamen-
tal information (resp. the endogenous noisy signal) on the stock price grows (resp.
decreases), thereby increasing the stocks volatility.
The behavior of the price of risk is more intricate. As for the stock price, the
sensitivity to fundamental information increases. The volatility of the price of risk
therefore increases over time. The sensitivity with respect to the endogenous public
signal can exhibit three types of patterns. If !i!20 < 1, it decreases over time. If
!i!20 > 1 and !
i!2T < 1, it initially increases, then decreases. If !
i!20 > 1 and
!i!2T > 1, it increases throughout. The possibility of an \-shaped pattern reects
the U -shaped behavior of the WAPR. Figure 32 illustrates the price of risk and
volatility behaviors. The gure presents the dynamic behavior of St and  (t) for
t 2 [0; T ]. Parameter values are T = 1, D = 0:1,  = STD [G],  = 0:5. The
weight of informed and mimicking noise traders are !i = !n = 1
3
.
The impact of risk attitudes is outlined next.
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Figure 32: Stock volatility and sensitivity of WAPR to fundamental
information
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Corollary 10 The stock price is a increasing function of risk tolerance, but its sen-
sitivity coe¢ cients with respect to fundamental information and to the noisy signal
do not depend on it. Likewise, the volatility of the stock price is not a¤ected by risk
tolerance. The stocks risk premium is a decreasing function of risk tolerance.
An increase in risk tolerance promotes an increase in the demand for the stock,
which increases value. As shown by expression (3.11) for F (t), risk tolerance ef-
fectively acts on the risk discount embedded in the stock price. When risk tolerance
increases, the willingness to bear risk increases, reducing the price discount required to
hold the asset. The absence of an impact on the coe¢ cients (A(t); B(t)) capturing the
price sensitivity to the information sources (Dt; Z), follows from the mean-variance
structure of the demand functions and the assumption of common risk attitudes
across investors. Under these circumstances, the aggregate demand function is an
a¢ ne function of the WAPR, that carries information and is unrelated to risk at-
titudes. The stock price inherits this behavior. It depends on information through
the WAPR, una¤ected by risk attitudes. Moreover, the absence of an impact on the
sensitivity A (t) with respect to the fundamental implies that the volatility of the
stock price is not a¤ected by risk attitudes either.
Because aggregate demand has a mean-variance form, the risk premium is also
linear in the PIPR. The risk premium is determined by the return variance per unit
risk tolerance adjusted by a discount related to the WAPR. Given that the variance
of the stock price and the WAPR do not depend on risk attitudes the result stated
follows.
The last corollary in this section reports the e¤ects of variations in the population
of investors and in the noise trading bias.
Corollary 11 Suppose that the ratio of informed to noise trader, s  !i=!n, in-
creases, but that their combined fraction in the population, ! = !i + !n, stays the
same. Under this scenario, the sensitivity of the stock price with respect to fundamen-
tal information and its volatility both decrease. The stocks risk premium can increase
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or decrease. If the noise trading bias    E [G] (i.e., ) increases, the stock price
decreases. The stock volatility is not a¤ected. The stocks risk premium increases.
When the fraction of informed to noise trader s increases, the information ex-
tracted from the price becomes more precise. This tames the response to other sources
of information such as the fundamental. The volatility of the stock price, which is en-
tirely driven by the volatility of the fundamental, inherits this behavior. In contrast,
the stock risk premium can increase or decrease because of the conicting e¤ects on
the coe¢ cients of the WARP. The e¤ects of noise trading bias are straightforward
and follow from the behavior of the non-stochastic component of the WARP.
3.2.4 Market Depth and Investor Strategies
Market Depth Properties
Market depth seeks to capture the impact of trading on the price. It is typically
measured by the inverse of the coe¢ cient of the regression of the stock price on
the complementary demand function (Kyle (1985)). Properties of market depth are
described next,
Corollary 12 Market depth m is given by,
m (t) 

d [St; Nt]
d [Nt; Nt]
 1
=
!u 
D
(t)
A(t)
D  !u D (t)A(t)D
!u 
D
(t)
A(t)
D  A (t)D
=
!u  (t)
A2 (t)D
: (3.16)
Market depth is negative, and increases over time if and only if ! > 1=2. Under
this condition, its minimal and maximal values are reached at the initial and terminal
dates,
m (0) =  !
u ! (!n)2
 

2
H (0)M (0)

H (0)
H (T )
2! 
M (0)
M (T )
2(1 !)
m (T ) =  !
u ! (!n)2
 

2
H (T )M (T )
:
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It also decreases with risk tolerance   and increases with the fraction s of informed.
Market depth is not related to the bias component .
Market depth is negative because the covariance between the price change and
the change in the combined demand of the informed and the noise trader is negative.
The passage of time has two e¤ects on depth. On the one hand, it increases the
volatility of the stock price, which increases the covariance between the stock price
change and the demand change. On the other hand, it has a negative e¤ect on the
volatility of the complementary demand through the coe¢ cient  (t), which becomes
more negative. The trade-o¤ between these two opposite e¤ects is determined by the
fraction of informed and noise trader in the total population. When this fraction is
greater than half, the rst e¤ect dominates, leading to an increasing market depth
over time, i.e., a market depth that becomes less negative. When the informed and
noise trader are a majority, the price e¤ect is dominated by the demand e¤ect. When
the informed and the noise trader form a minority, the price impact is su¢ ciently
important to o¤set the demand e¤ect.
The behavior with respect to the other quantities such as risk tolerance and the
informed-to-noise trader ratio is monotone. The latter increases, because the volatil-
ity of the stock price decreases while the volatility of the complementary demand
increases. Both e¤ects contribute to an increase in market depth.
Remark 13 Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2013) generate time-varying market depth by
extending Kyle (1985) to more general processes for exogenous noise trading. Their
time-varying measures of liquidity are supported by their empirical ndings (Collin-
Dufresne and Fos (2014)) that, in contrast to the predictions of standard microstruc-
ture models, market depth can increase with more informed trading. Market depth in
the present model is tied to the underlying fundamental. It is time-varying and can
also increase with informed trading.
33
Momentum and Reversal Strategies
The next corollary describes the investment strategies of the three groups of agents.
Corollary 14 Let N i;Gt =  
Gjm
t (G) =
S
t be the private information component of the
informed demand. The optimal portfolio policy of the informed (resp. uninformed) is
a contrarian (resp. momentum) strategy,
d [Nu; S]t
dt
=
 
D
d [m; D]t
dt
=    
D
d [t (Z;!) ; D]t
dt
=    (t) > 0
d

N i;G; S

t
dt
=
 
D
d
h
Gjm (G) ; D
i
t
dt
=    
D
H (t)
d

GjD;Z ;WD

t
dt
=
 
!
 (t) < 0
d [N i; S]t
dt
=
d

Nu +N i;G; S

t
dt
=  

 1 + 1
!

 (t) < 0:
The mimicking noise trader pursues a contrarian strategy,
d [Nm; S] =  d !iN i + !uNu; S
t
=
!n
!
(1  !)  A (t)  (t) < 0:
Momentum, for the uninformed strategy, is a decreasing function of the conditional
variance H (t) and the weight !n of mimicking noise traders. It increases over the
dividend cycle. The informed strategy is contrarian because the contrarian private
information component N i;Gt dominates the overall portfolio behavior. Reversal de-
creases (i.e., becomes more pronounced) with respect to H (t) and t. The contrarian
strategy of the mimicking noise trader is the counterpart of the informed and unin-
formed strategies.
The uninformed behaves as a trend-chaser because the endogenous market price
of risk is positively related to the fundamental. A positive shock to the fundamental
induces an increase in the market price of risk, prompting an increase in the unin-
formed portfolio demand. The behavior of the informed is the opposite. The reason
is because the local value of private information, the PIPR, is negatively correlated
with the fundamental. The informed acts as a contrarian. Market clearing ensures
that the noise trader adopts a contrarian strategy.
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Figure 33: Optimal portfolio holdings
Over time, these strategies grow. Contrarians (resp. trend-chasers) become more
intense contrarian (resp. trend-chasers). This follows from the fact that fundamental
information becomes more important as the dividend date approaches. The market
price of risk and the PIPR both become more sensitive to fundamental news over time,
prompting investors to amplify their reactions to fundamental news. See Figure 33
for illustration. The gure shows the optimal portfolio holdings (z-axis) of the public
and the informed investor in the competitive equilibrium as a function of time t (x-
axis) and dividends Dt (y-axis). Parameter values are T = 1,   = 1=8, D = 0:1,
D = 0:05, D0 = 1,  = E [G],  = STD [G],  = 0:1, G = D0 +DT ,  = 0:9G.
The weights of the informed and the mimicking noise traders are !i = !n = 1
3
.
Remark 15 These ndings di¤er from those in Albuquerque and Miao (2013) and
Wang (1993). In Wangs model, the uninformed can be a trend chaser or a contrarian.
The informed is a contrarian. The uninformed is a momentum trader if the positive
covariance associated with fundamental information dominates the covariance related
to the endogenous signal. In Albuquerque and Miao, the uninformed (resp. informed)
is a contrarian (resp. trend chaser). This pattern is attributable to the agentsinfor-
mation structures and the properties of the private investment opportunity available
to the informed. In this model, the informed invests in the private opportunity and
hedges the associated exposure to risk with the stock. The hedging component of the
stock demand creates the condition for trend chasing behavior.
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Chapter 4
Asset Pricing with Actively Managed
Fund
This chapter develops an equilibrium model with an actively managed fund. Section
4.1 presents the structure of the model. Section 4.2 describes the equilibrium structure
and Section 4.3 discusses the properties of equilibrium.
4.1 A General Equilibrium Model
4.1.1 Agents, Assets and Private Information
The economy is populated by three types of agents: uninformed investors with hetero-
geneous risk tolerances, a (representative) informed investor and a (representative)
noise trader.
The nancial market consists of two assets : a riskfree asset which pays interest
rate r and a risky asset which pays a liquidating dividend DT at terminal date T ; the
dividend process follows a Brownian Motion with constant drift D and volatility D
dDt = Ddt+ DdWDt; t 2 [0; T ]
where WD is a standard Brownian Motion process with ltration FD(:). The process D
can be viewed as a fundamental factor that drives the terminal dividend. This risky
asset can be regarded as the passive index because there is one stock in the economy.
The informed investor has skill to extract a noisy signal about the terminal div-
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idend payment which is G = DT + ; where the signal noise  is N
 
0; 2

: Skill is
measured by the precision  =
 
2
 1
of the signal. A high value of 2 corresponds
a low signal precision, and thus skill decreases.
The noise trader who, as in the previous model, has no private information about
the asset payo¤ tries to mimic the behavior of the informed investor but using the
false signal ; which is pure noise   N  0; 2 :
The uninformed investors are heterogeneous in risk tolerances. The risk tolerance
specic to each investor is privately known by him. As in Detemple (2002)1 , the
uninformed investorspreferences are unknown to the fund manager. These investors
are indexed by their risk tolerances. Their distribution is represented by the function
F ( ) such that F ( u) = 0 and F
 
 
u
= 1; and the corresponding density is f ( ) :
These investors observe prices and other quantities that are in the public information
ltration, dened by Fmt   this public information is endogenously determined in
equilibrium
4.1.2 Asset Price and Information Sets
Given the information generated by the dividend process and both the true and
false signals (i.e. G and ), trading takes place in continuous time and the stock
index S is endogenously determined. Because there are two sources of uncertainty,
WD generated by the fundamental information and  by the noise trader, standard
representation theorems can be applied to write any candidate price process as
dSt = tdt+ tdWt = t (tdt+ dWt) ; ST = DT
where Wt is the Brownian Motion under the public ltration Fmt : As in the previous
model, the information ltration Fmt is endogenously determined as a result of the
1Detemple, Jerome B., (2002), Asset pricing in an intertemporal partially-revealing rational ex-
pectations equilibrium, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, issue 1-2, p. 219-248.
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interaction between the fundamental information Dt, the true signal G and the false
one : The di¤erence is that in this model, the dissemination of information is endoge-
nously determined. The coe¢ cients (t; t) of the price process are also endogenous
and adapted to the public information Fmt : The information ltration FS(:) is in the
public information Fm(:): That is, FS(:)  Fm(:):
As the informed fund manager has private information, his information ltration
FGt is enlarged by the signal G and consequently it is equivalent to the sigma algebra
FGt  fG _ Fmt g : Thus, Wt is no longer the standard Brownian Motion with respect
to the enlarged ltration FGt : The new standard Brownian Motion WGt with respect
to FGt is the translated process
dWGt = dWt   Gjmt (G) dt
where t
Gjm
t (G) is the stock index premium inferred from the private information.
Therefore, the stock index from the fund managers perspective follows the dynamics
dSt = tdt+ t

dWGt + 
Gjm
t dt

= t

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

dt+ dWGt

:
This representation of the stock index emphasizes how the information advantage
is translated to the stock index premium with respect to the private information
ltration.
4.1.3 Agent Preferences and Optimal Portfolio Choices
The representative informed investor chooses an optimal portfolio to maximize his
utility derived from his terminal wealth minus the disutility incurred by the local
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uctuations of his portfolios wealth.
U i = max
N it
E
2666664 X iT|{z}utility from terminal wealth  
1
2 i
TZ
0
d


X i

t| {z }
disutility from managing the portfolio

FG0
3777775
such that
dX it = N
i
tt

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

dt+ dWGt

:
Because the anticipative information which is only available to the informed agent is
valuable, there is a demand for it from the uninformed investors. Hence, a market for
the active fund emerges. The informed agent o¤ers the uninformed ones an opportu-
nity to invest in his actively managed fund in exchange for a fee. This fee is equal
to a fraction  of the terminal wealth of the active portfolio. The fund manager (i.e.
the informed agent) chooses the investment management fee  to maximize his total
utility obtained from managing this active fund. To avoid the conict of interests,
the fund manager should have two separate accounts: his own account and the active
fund account, and he cannot withdraw/inject money from one account to the other.
The uninformed investors have two investment options - they can invest in the
active fund or self-manage their own wealth. If an investor u with risk tolerance  u
delegates his wealth to the fund manager, his utility will be
Uu;i ( u) = E
24Xu;iT   12 u
TZ
0
d


Xu;i

t
Fm0
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| {z }
controlled by the hidden action of the manager
+
1
bu
E
24 TZ
0
d


Xu;i

t
Fm0
35
| {z }
convenience benet
 E   Xu;iT   xu;i0 Fm0 | {z }
investment fee
= E
24(1  )Xu;iT + xu;i0    12 u   1bu
 TZ
0
d


Xu;i

t
Fm0
35
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After delegating all wealth to the fund manager, the investor need not worry about
the local uctuations of his wealth dynamics during the whole investment horizon,
so I assume that the convenience benet matches the disutility incurred by the local
wealth uctuations, that is bu = 2 u: The investor, therefore, only cares about the
expected return at the end of the investment horizon.
Alternatively, the investor can manage his wealth. He chooses an optimal portfolio
to maximize his utility
Uu ( u) = max
Nut
E
24XuT   12 u
TZ
0
d hXuit
Fm0
35
subject to
dXut = N
u
t t (tdt+ dWt) :
The fund manager, upon receiving the compensation  (XuT   xu0) from the investor
u, makes an investment on his clients behalf. He maximizes the utility derived from
the compensation minus the disutility incurred by the local uctuations of the active
portfolios wealth.
U i;i ( u) = max
Nu;it
Ei
2666664 
 
Xu;iT   xu0
| {z }
utility from compensation
  1
2q
TZ
0
d


Xu;i

t| {z }
disutility from managing the portfolio

FG0
3777775
where q is the fund managers risk taking level.
Let 
e be the set of uninformed investors choosing to invest in the active fund if
the investment fee is e: The optimal fee  chosen by the fund manager maximizes his
total utility obtained from managing the active fund
 = arg maxe
Z
 u2
e
U i;i ( u) f ( u) d u:
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The set 
 is determined endogenously in equilibrium.
Proposition 16 The optimal number of shares held in the fund managers account,
the self-managed accounts and the active fund accounts are
N it =  
i t + 
Gjm
t (G)
t
Nut ( 
u) =  u
t
t
if  u =2 
; Nu;it ( u) =
q

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

t
if  u 2 

for t 2 [0; T ] where t is the market price of risk, 
 is the set of the investors in the
active fund. The total share holdings in the active fund account are
Nactivet =
Z
 u2

q

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

t
f ( u) d u
and the total share holdings by the remaining public investors are
Npublict =
Z
 u =2

 u
t
t
f ( u) d u:
The optimal demands are of mean-variance structure. The total share holdings in
the active fund account increase in the fund managers risk taking level q: The higher
the risk-taking level q; the riskier the active portfolio. As the fund manager cannot
observe the specic characteristics of each of his clients, the investment strategy he
uses for each of his clients is the same and equal toNu;it : Thus, the total share holdings
in the active fund Nactivet are proportional to the number of investors in the fund. On
the other hand, the investors who self-manage their portfolios take into account their
specic risk tolerances and can customize their portfolios accordingly. As a result,
the total share holdings by the remaining public investors Npublict depends on their
collective risk tolerances.
Moreover, the investors in the active fund are e¤ectively converted to informed
ones with risk tolerances equal to the product of the investment fee  and the man-
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agers risk-taking level q. This conversion changes both the price informativeness
and the economys risk tolerance. The price informativeness directly a¤ects the in-
vestorsdecisions as to whether it is worth paying the investment fee to invest in the
active fund or not. The economys risk tolerance directly a¤ects the Sharpe ratio
of the risky asset and accordingly the agentsinvestment decisions. Therefore, each
investors action (either actively manage or self manage his wealth) inuences other
investorsbehaviors.
Remark 17 The noise trader mimics the informed manager, and the number of
shares he demands is
Nnt =  
n t + 
Gjm
t ()
t
:
This demand is based on the false signal  which is completely unrelated to the fun-
damental. Hence, the quantity  n 
Gjm
t ()
t
represents the speculative demand associated
with the pure noise.
4.1.4 Market for Actively Managed Fund
There is an adverse selection in the market for the active fund because only the low
risk tolerance investors are attracted to the fund.
Proposition 18 (Adverse Selection and Market Segmentation) Given the in-
vestment management fee ; there exists a threshold risk tolerance  u; = T such that
the investors who have risk tolerances less than or equal to  u; will opt to invest in
the actively managed fund. The others will self-managed their wealth. The expression
for the threshold risk tolerance is
T = 2 (1  )q E
24 TZ
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0
35,E
24 TZ
0
2tdt
Fm0
35 :
This proposition shows that the actively managed fund attracts public investors
regardless of the funds performance. Although the investors care about the expected
returns, the ones who self-manage their portfolios have additionally disutilities in-
curred by the local wealth uctuations throughout the horizon. These disutilities
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are attributed to the time spent on conducting fundamental analysis and rebalancing
portfolios in response to changes in wealth. On the other hand, the ones who delegate
their wealth do not have these disutilities. Due to the heterogeneity in the risk toler-
ances, the uninformed investorsvaluations of the investment service are di¤erent. In
fact, the investor with the lowest risk tolerance values the service the most, and the
one with the highest risk tolerance values the service the least. The adverse selection
naturally arises because the fund manager is unable to observe the investorschar-
acteristics. Charging a uniform fee, the fund manager ends up attracting only the
low risk tolerance investors to his fund. The adverse selection splits the uninformed
population into two separate groups, the low risk tolerance investors who will invest
in the active fund and the high risk tolerance ones who will manage their own port-
folios. Actually, the low risk tolerance investors are strictly better-o¤ while the fund
managers skill is undervalued.
Remark 19 (Herding behavior) The investorsherding behavior emerges because
of the segmentation in the active fund. Whenever an investor switches to the active
fund, he e¤ectively becomes an informed one. This action of his increases the public
risk tolerance (i.e the average risk tolerance of the remaining uninformed investors)
and also enhances the price informativeness. That the public has higher average
risk tolerance means the market can absorb more risk, and thus the risky assets
Sharpe ratio decreases. The lower Sharpe ratio draws more investors to the active
fund because the returns on their self-managed portfolios are lower. The inow of
investors continues until prices are su¢ ciently informative,i.e., enough investors are
converted to informed ones. Likewise, when one investor withdraws from the active
fund, the Sharpe ratio will be higher and prices are less informative. Thus, more
investors start leaving the active fund because they can earn higher returns by self-
managing their wealth. The outow of investors will stop when prices are no longer
informative enough. In short, the ow is in the direction such that the marginal
benet of investing in the active fund is equal to the marginal cost of forgoing the
public signal.
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Moreover, the market segmentation result simplies the managers problem of
optimizing his service fee : The maximization problem becomes
 = arg maxe
 u;
eZ
 u
U i;i ( u) f ( u) d u:
The next proposition pins down the optimal investment fee chosen by the manager.
Proposition 20 (Optimal Investment Fee) The optimal fee  and the corre-
sponding threshold risk tolerance  u;

solve the system of equations
 = 1  1
2
1
F( u;)
 u;f( u;)
+ 1
(4.1)
 u; = 2 (1  )q E
24 TZ
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0
35,E
24 TZ
0
2tdt
Fm0
35 (4.2)
and  must satisfy
1
2
<  < arg max
x2[ u; u]
 
1  1
2
1
F (x)
 u;f(x)
+ 1
!
: (4.3)
The equation (4.2) is the demand equation, i.e. the publics response to the
fund managers investment management fee . The equation (4.1) is the fund man-
agers optimal fee given the public populations response described in the equation
(4.2). From the equation (4.1), the optimal investment fee is always greater than
1=2; and thus the equation (4.2) implies that the immediate response of the public
to an increase in fee is that the investors with risk tolerances equal or close to the
risk tolerance threshold  u; will switch to self-managing their wealth. Namely, the
short-run demand for the active fund decreases when the fee temporarily increases.
However, there is no supply curve in the market for the active fund, the fee is set
purely by the distribution of risk tolerances of the investors and the managers risk-
taking level, taking the risky asset prices as given. The equation (4.3) guarantees
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that the threshold risk tolerance lies in its domain

 u; 
u
Corollary 21 (Existence of an Equilibrium in Active Fund Market) For any
distribution F; risk tolerance band

 u; 
u
and the signal G; there exists a bounded
interval [qmin; qmax] such that for any q 2 [qmin; qmax] ; there exists a pair
 
;  u;

that solves the xed point system of equations (4.1) and (4.2).
In this partial equilibrium analysis (i.e. the asset price process is taken as given),
due to the adverse selection in the active fund market, the public investors have an
automatic mechanism to protect themselves from the managers excessive risk-taking
behavior. Indeed, the distribution of risk tolerances among the public investors curbs
the fund managers risk-taking levels. The manager cannot execute a strategy that is
excessively risky (q > qmax) or very conservative (q < qmax). Otherwise, no one would
want to invest in the active fund. In fact when the range of risk tolerances of the public
is bounded, the fund manager following an extremely conservative strategy gives the
investors lower expected returns than they could have earned by self-managing their
wealth, then the active fund collapses. Likewise, taking excessive risk could increase
fund size but up to a certain limit. One reason is that when the active fund attracts
enough investors, the fee is xed by the aggregate investorsvaluations of the wealth
management service. Thus taking on more risk is undesirable.
4.1.5 Competitive Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium
A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) for the economy under consideration is
the investment management fee , the triple of demands (Nu ( u) ; N i; Nu;i ( u)) and
a price process dSt = tdt+ tdWt; ST = DT such that
(i) Individual rationality: N j the optimal demand for agent j 2 fu; ui; ig ; taking
the price process as given, and
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(ii) Market Clearing:
!u
0B@  
uZ
 u;
Nu ( ) f ( ) d  +
 u;Z
 u
Nu;if ( ) d 
1CA+ !iN i + !nNn = 1:
The REE is said to be noisy (NREE) if the informed and uninformed agents
ltrations di¤er, Fu(:)  F i(:):
4.2 The Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium Structure
Let E (; ) denote an economy in which an investment fee is  and a risk tolerance
threshold is  : Before presenting the NREE in an economy with an endogenous fee 
and risk tolerance threshold  , it is useful to dene the following quantities
F ( ) 
 Z
 u
f ( u) d u; E ( ) 
 
uZ
 
 uf ( u) d u
wE(; )u  !uE ( ) ; wE(; )i  !uqF ( ) + !i i; wE(; )n  !n n
wE(; )  wE(; )i + wE(; )n ; WE(; )  wE(; )u + wE(; )i + wE(; )n
Ht  2D (T   t) + 2 ; ME(; )t 

w
E(; )
i
2
Ht +
 
wE(; )n
2
2
E(; ) (t; s)  w
E(; )
i 
2
D (s  t)
M
E(; )
t
ZE(; )  wE(; )i G+ wE(; )n 
A
E(; )
t 

HT
Ht
wE(; )
WE(; )
 
M
E(; )
T
M
E(; )
t
!1 wE(; )
WE(; )

E(; )
t  D
M
E(; )
t   wE(; )i HtwE(; )
HtM
E(; )
t
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E(; )
t  D

 ME(; )t +

w
E(; )
i
2
Ht

wE(; )
HtM
E(; )
t

E(; )
t  DD

 ME(; )t +

w
E(; )
i
2
Ht

wE(; )
T   t
HtM
E(; )
t
:
The next proposition identify the necessary condition for the existence of the Noisy
Rational Expectations Equilibrium.
Proposition 22 If a Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium exists, there must exist
a pair (qmin; qmax) such that the managers risk-taking level q satises q 2 [qmin; qmax] :
Similar to partial equilibrium analysis, in general equilibrium, the asymmetric in-
formation creates an automatic mechanism for the public investors to protect them-
selves from the managers excessive risk-taking. In fact, the distribution of risk tol-
erances among the public investors coupled with the adverse selection curb the fund
managers risk-taking behaviors. The di¤erence with the partial equilibrium analysis
is that there are reactions of the stock market in response to the managers risk-taking
behavior. As before, the manager cannot implement a strategy that is excessively
risky or very conservative. Otherwise, no one would want to invest in the active fund.
In particular, the distribution of risk tolerances sets the investorsdesired returns
relative to the market return. On the other hand, the adverse selection induces a
lower market risk premium and lower volatility if the fund manager takes on more
risk. If the fund manager follows a very conservative strategy gives the investors a
lower expected return than they could earn from the market return by self-managing
their wealth, then the active fund collapses. By taking on more risk, the manager
could only increase fund size up to a certain extent. The reason is that when the
active fund attracts enough investors, the market reacts to his excessive risk-taking
by substantially lowering the volatility and risk premium, so taking on more risk just
reduces the Sharpe ratio of the asset and makes the asset less attractive to hold; this
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action is suboptimal for the fund manager.
Dene E(; )t ; 
E(; )
t ; and 
Gjm;E(; )
t as

E(; )
t 
A
E(; )
t D  


E(; )
t Z
E(; ) + E(; )t Dt + 
E(; )
t

WE(; )
; 
E(; )
t  AE(; )t D
(4.4)

Gjm;E(; )
t (G) 
D
H (t)
(G Dt   D (T   t)) (4.5)
  w
E(; )
i D
ME(; ) (t)

ZE(; )   wE(; )i (Dt + D (T   t))

: (4.6)
Proposition 23 (Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium) If there exists a
pair
 
; u;

that solves the system of xed point equations (4.1) and (4.2) and 
satises the condition (4.3), where t and 
Gjm
t (G) are dened by (4.4) and (4.5),
then this pair
 
; u;

will constitute an NREE equilibrium where the market price
of risk, volatility, PIPR are 
E(; u;)
t ; 
E(; u;)
t and 
Gjm;E(; u;)
t (G). The en-
dogenously generated public signal is
ZE(
; u;

)  wE(
; u;

)
i G+ w
E(; u;)
n 
The equilibrium stock price is
S
E(; u;)
t = A
E(; u;)
t Dt +B
E(; u;)
t Z + F
E(; u;)
t
where
B
E(; u;)
t =
D
R T
t
A
E(; u;)
s


E(; u;)
s + 
E(; u;)
s 
E(; u;) (t; s)

ds
WE(
; u;)
+E(
; u;

) (t; T )
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F
E(; u;)
t = A
E(; u;)
t D (T   t) 
2D
WE(
; u;)
TZ
t

A
E(; u;)
s
2
ds
+
D
WE(
; u;)
TZ
t
A
E(; u;)
s 
E(; u;)
s ds:
The Brownian Motion in the public information is the process
dW
E(; u;)
t = dWDt   
mjD;E(; u;)
t
where

mjD;E(; u;)
t =
w
E(; u;)
i D

Z   wE(
; u;

)
i (Dt + D (T   t))


w
E(; u;)
i
2
Ht +

w
E(; u;)
n
2
2
:
Miscellaneous information such as the private information G and the purely noisy
information  are disseminated to the public in the form of ZE(
; u;

)  wE(
; u;

)
i G+
w
E(; u;)
n : This quantity Z is the public signal endogenously generated in the equi-
librium. Thus, by observing the total trades of the fund manager and the noise trader,
the public investors partially learn about the anticipative information G. However
the private informational content (which is measured by the weight w
E(; u;

)
i
w
E(; u;)
n
) col-
lected from the market data is a¤ected by the active fund sector. More precisely,
the investors investing in the active fund are e¤ectively converted to informed ones
with risk tolerances equal to the product of the investment fee  and the managers
risk-taking level q. This conversion changes both the price informativeness and the
economys risk tolerance.
First, price informativeness plays a major role in determining the equilibrium risky
asset prices. In particular, the fund managers risk-taking behavior or managerial skill
has a direct impact on the number of public investors drawn to the active fund, so
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changes in the active fund market a¤ect the private informational content in the
public signal. As the public investors depend purely on the fundamental information
Dt and the endogenous public signal Z; their trades are a¤ected by the changes in the
active fund market. In short, the presence of the active fund sector endogenizes the
process of anticipative information dissemination, a¤ecting the aggregate demand of
the risky asset, and consequently the equilibrium prices.
Second, changes in the average public risk tolerance are also crucial in determining
the equilibrium market price of risk (i.e. Sharpe ratio) and volatility. The market
price of risk and volatility reect the public perception of the uncertainties in the stock
market. If the public has collectively high risk tolerance, the market price of risk and
volatility must be low. Because of the segmentation in the market for the active fund,
the average public risk tolerance will be higher (lower) if more (less) investors invest
in the active fund. Therefore, the presence of the active fund inuences the public
capacity to absorb the market risk, a¤ecting the equilibrium stock price.
Lastly, in contrast to a popular belief that a higher skilled fund manager can
attract more investors to his active fund, the chapter shows that it might not be
the case. In fact, changes in the managerial skill induce changes in the investment
management fee and the threshold risk tolerance. As a result, all three factors - private
information precision, price informativeness and economys overall risk tolerance -
change. The three simultaneously interacting e¤ects plus the distribution of risk
tolerances among the public investors yield new asset pricing implications which will
be described and illustrated numerically in Section 4.3.
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Figure 41: The relationship between Managerial Skill and Fund Size
is non-monotonic. Parameters !u = 0:2; !i = 0:4; !n = 0:4; q =
0:8; u = 0:1; 
u
= 1;  i = 2;  n = 2;  = 0:1; D = 0:1; D = 0:1:
4.3 Properties of Equilibrium
This section examines an economy in which the investorsrisk tolerances are uniformly
distributed
f ( ) =
1
 
u    u ; F ( ) =
 Z
 u
f ( ) d  =
    u
 
u    u :
The corresponding xed point equations become
 = 1  1
2
1
2   u= u;
 u; = 2 (1  )q E
24 TZ
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0
35,E
24 TZ
0
2tdt
Fm0
35
and
1
2
<  < 1  1
2
1
2   u= u :
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4.3.1 Can Fund Size Predict Managerial Skill?
Among thousands of active funds, an investor necessarily needs to identify truly
skilled fund managers. The identication problem is far more complicated because
as in Figure (41), the relationship between fund size and managerial skill is not
monotonic. Contrary to popular belief that with higher managerial skill, the rm
will expand and increase its scale, in the market for active funds investors should act
cautiously because fund size is not a reliable indicator of the managers skill level.
The relationship between the two, in fact, has a double hump shape.
What happens is as follows. First, an increase in managerial skill immediately in-
creases the private information precision and the price informativeness. The investor
who knows that the manager has higher skill has two options: he either invests in
the active fund or self-manages his wealth. It is tempting to conclude that if the
private information e¤ect dominates the price informativeness e¤ect, he should invest
in the active fund and vice versa. If this were true, the relationship between fund
size and managerial skill would have an inverted U-shape. Particularly, starting at
very low skill, an increase in skill signicantly increases the private information preci-
sion, i.e., the private information precision e¤ect dominates the price informativeness
one. When skill is su¢ ciently high, an increase in skill no longer produces such a
strong private information precision e¤ect, and thus the price informativeness e¤ect
dominates it. This means that as skill increases, the investors are rst drawn to the
active fund but then they leave it because they are better o¤ using the public signal
rather than paying the investment fee to extract the benet from the private infor-
mation. However, the relationship observed in Figure (41) is a double hump shaped
curve. Actually, the investors not just evaluate the immediate benets of the private
information precision and the price informativeness but also take into account the
herding behavior of their peers. This herding behavior is explained in Remark 19.
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The investorsherding behavior emerges because of the segmentation in the active
fund. Whenever an investor switches to the active fund, there is an inow of investors
to the active fund. Likewise, if one investor withdraws from the active fund, there
is an outow of investors from the active fund. In fact, some investors are herded
together, and the ow is in the direction such that the marginal benet of obtaining
the anticipative information is equal to the marginal cost of forgoing the public sig-
nal. Therefore, the equilibrium fund size is determined by the collective actions of
all agents. In fact, there are three forces simultaneously interacting in response to
the managers higher skill: private information precision, price informativeness and
overall risk tolerance of the economy; the overall result is a double hump shaped curve
of the fund size - investment fee relationship.
In particular, the private information precision has a positive e¤ect on the equi-
librium fund size. The price informativeness, on the contrary, has a negative e¤ect
on the fund size because some investors are better o¤ using the endogenous public
signal instead of paying the fund manager some fee. Specic to the economy setup
in Figure (41), the second hump is the result of the risk tolerance e¤ect. In general,
the risk tolerance e¤ect is ambiguous. Any investor needs to take into account his
peersherding behaviors. Therefore, the investor essentially compares the two nal
results in order to decide whether to join the active fund or not, namely whether the
benet of the anticipative information if he joins the active fund is greater than the
higher Sharpe ratio he earns if he does otherwise. As the investorsrisk tolerances
have non-linear e¤ects on the equilibrium risky asset prices, the herding direction is
ambiguous.
4.3.2 InvestorsReaction to Fund Manager Risk Taking
The riskier the active portfolio, the more investors invest in the active fund because
by delegating their wealth, the investors only care about the expected return on
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Figure 42: Fund Size is increasing in Managers Risk Taking Level q 2
[qmin; qmax] : If q < qmin or q > qmax, no equilibrium exists. Parameters
!u = 0:2; !i = 0:4; !n = 0:4; 
u = 0:1; 
u
= 1;  i = 2;  n = 2;  = 0:1;
 = 0:1; D = 0:1; D = 0:1
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Figure 43: Fund Size is increasing in Managers Risk Taking Level q 2
[qmin; qmax] : If q < qmin or q > qmax, no equilibrium exists. Parameters
!u = 0:2; !i = 0:4; !n = 0:4; 
u = 0:1; 
u
= 2;  i = 2;  n = 2;  = 0:1;
 = 0:1; D = 0:1; D = 0:1
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the active portfolio while the uctuations in the active account are taken care of by
the fund manager. The more risk the fund manager takes, the higher the expected
return and the larger the number of investors attracted. The fund size, therefore,
increases in the managers risk-taking level. However, if the fund manager takes on
more risk, the economys overall risk tolerance is essentially much higher. Therefore,
the risk premium decreases. A lower risk premium makes some of the investors who
are self-managing their portfolios switch to the active fund because the returns on
their self-managed portfolios are lower. Therefore, investing in the active fund can
insure uninformed investors against the competition with the informed and the very
high risk tolerance investors.
In di¤erent types of economies (i.e. di¤erent distribution of risk tolerances among
public investors), the managers possible risk-taking levels are in di¤erent ranges.
For example, consider the two economies where  i = 2; and  n = 2; while the tol-
erance  u ranges from  u = 0:1 to  
u
= 1 in Figure (42) and  u = 2 in Figure
(43): In all economies, the fund manager could take risk q which is even higher than
the highest risk tolerance of the public investors: More precisely, in Figure (42)
the possible range of managers risk taking level is [qmin = 0:2; qmax = 2:55] while the
uninformed public population risk tolerance band is

 u = 0:1; 
u
= 1

: In Figure
(43), the range for managers risk-taking level so that an equilibrium exists is now
[qmin = 0:2; qmax = 5:2] while the public risk tolerance ranges from

 u = 0:1; 
u
= 2

:
Therefore, the distribution of risk tolerances among investors a¤ects the fund man-
agers risk-taking behavior.
Moreover, by increasing the risk-taking level, the active fund sector cannot always
attract the whole public population as depicted in Figure (42) or (43). As soon as
the distribution of the risk tolerances is polarized, the fund manager fails to attract
as many investors as he wants by taking on more risk. Because of polarization in
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Figure 44: Fund Size is increasing in Managers risk-taking level.
Parameters !u = 0:2; !i = 0:4; !n = 0:4; u = 0:1; 
u
= 1;  i = 2;
 n = 2;  = 0:1;  = 0:1; D = 0:1; D = 0:1
investorsrisk tolerances, the market reacts immediately to his risk-taking behavior.
Consider a polarized distribution which is mathematically represented by
f ( ) =
3(    u+ u
2
)2
( 
u    u+ u
2
)3   ( u    u+ u
2
)3
; F ( )
=
 Z
 u
f ( ) d  =
(    u+ u
2
)3   ( u    u+ u
2
)3
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u    u+ u
2
)3   ( u    u+ u
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Figure (44) plots the probability density (upper left), the cumulative distribution
(upper right), the relationship between the fund size and the managers risk-taking
(lower left), and the relationship between the fee and the managers risk-taking (lower
right). The manager can at most attract the low risk tolerance group but is never able
to draw any investor in the high risk tolerance group to his fund. The investors with
moderate risk tolerances are few, so the benet of attracting them to the fund is very
small while taking more risk incurs considerable costs. Therefore, the polarization
limits the expansion of the active fund.
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4.3.3 Market Reaction to Managers Risk Taking
In this section, the markets reactions to the managers risk-taking level are exam-
ined. As the managers risk-taking level increases, the market price of risk, volatility
and risk premium all decrease. Illustrated in Figure (45): The market price of risk
decreases because more uninformed investors switch to the active fund, only the very
high risk tolerance ones self-manage their portfolios. As a result, the public average
risk tolerance is higher, and those remaining public investors are able to absorb more
market risk. This leads to a decrease in the market price of risk, see Figure (47).
A decrease in volatility is the consequence of an increase in price informativeness.
Because the uninformed investors who are in the active fund are e¤ectively con-
verted to informed ones, the price informativeness increases. As shown in Detemple,
Rindisbacher & Truong (2014) the anticipative information stabilizes stock prices,
an increase in price informativeness necessarily induces a decrease in the equilibrium
volatility. Because both the market price of risk and volatility decrease in response
to an increase in the managers risk taking level, the risk premium which is a product
of market price of risk and volatility decreases as shown in Figure (46).
Therefore, the market reaction to the managers increasing risk-taking behavior
is to reduce the equilibrium market price of risk, volatility and risk premium.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis examines the structure and properties of non-stationary noisy rational
expectations equilibria in models with continuous trading and discrete dividend pay-
ment dates. The rst model studies an economy populated by an informed investor,
an uninformed investor and a noise trader. The second model considers the case
where the informed agent tries to sell his private information in the form of actively
managed funds in exchange for a fee.
In the rst model, equilibrium prices fail to be weak-form e¢ cient. Public infor-
mation is carried by the price-fundamental pair. Informed trading has a stabilizing
e¤ect, as it reduces the volatility of the stock price. Over the dividend cycle, the
stock price volatility, the price of risk and the covariance between the stock price and
the price of risk all increase.
The second model provides a micro-foundation for the existence and asset pricing
implications of the actively managed fund industry. The endogenization of private
information dissemination has a direct impact on the actively managed fund sector.
First, the active fund exists to insure the low risk tolerance investors against the
competition with the informed agents and the high risk tolerance investors in the
nancial market. Investment is not all about the returns but also the time and e¤ort
spent on managing a portfolio, so the low risk tolerance investors are strictly better
o¤with this alternative investment. Those should invest in the active funds. Second,
the active fund sector is distinct from other industries to the extent that the size
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of the actively managed fund is not monotonically increasing in the fund managers
skill level. Therefore, fund size is not a reliable indicator of the managerial skill. The
market also reacts to the managers increasing risk-taking behavior by reducing the
market price of risk, volatility and risk premium. Last, the public investors have
an automatic mechanism to protect themselves against the managers excessive risk-
taking. Indeed, the distribution of risk tolerances among the public investors together
with the adverse selection problem in the active fund market set limits on the fund
managers risk-taking levels. The manager cannot follow a strategy that is excessively
risky or very conservative, otherwise no one would want to invest in the active fund.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. The aggregate demand function Nat  !uNut + !iN it +
!nNnt is,
Nat = !
u 
St 
m
t
(St )
2 + !
i 
St

mt + 
Gjm
t (G)

(St )
2 + !
n 
St

mt + 
Gjm
t ()

(St )
2
where the function Gjmt (x) is endogenous. Conjecture that 
Gjm
t (x) is an a¢ ne
function of x and let t (z;!)  !iGjmt (x1)+!nGjmt (x2) where z = !ix1+ !nx2 and
! = !i + !n. Under this conjecture the aggregate demand function becomes Nat =
  (mt + t (Z;!)) =
S
t and, at equilibrium, N
a
t = 1, 
S
t 
m
t =
 
St
2
=   St t (Z;!).
Information revealed in equilibrium includes the noisy translation of the private signal
Z = !iG+ !n. Thus, Fm()  FD;Z() . Suppose that Fm() = FD;Z() . Given that,
G = DT +  = Dt + 
D (T   t) +
TZ
t
DdWDs + 
Z = !iG+ !n = !i
 
Dt + 
D (T   t)+ !i
0@ TZ
t
DdWDs + 
1A+ !n
the conditional density at time t of the signal is pGt (x) =
1

GjD;Z
t
n

x GjD;Zt

GjD;Z
t

where,

GjD;Z
t = Dt + 
D (T   t) + t

Z   !i  Dt + D (T   t)  !n


GjD;Z
t
2
=
 
D
2
(T   t) +  2  1  t!i  H (t)  1  t!i
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t =
!i
 
D
2
(T   t) +  2
M (t)
=
!iH (t)
M (t)
M (t) =
 
!i
2  
D
2
(T   t) +  2+ (!n)2  2 =  !i2H (t) + (!n)2  2
(M (t) is the variance of Z   !i  Dt + D (T   t) = !i R Tt DdWDs +  + !n).
Itos lemma gives the PIPR,

Gjm
t (x) =
x  GjD;Zt

GjD;Z
t
2  1  t!iD = x  GjD;ZtH (t) D:
The PIPR for dividend risk, Gjmt (x), is a¢ ne in x, as conjectured.
The information revealed in equilibrium is contained in,
t (Z;!)  !iGjmt (G) + !nGjmt () =
Z   (!i + !n)GjD;Zt
H (t)
D  Z   !
GjD;Z
t
H (t)
D
=
Z   !  (1  t!i)  Dt + D (T   t)+ t  Z   !n
H (t)
D
=

1  t!
H (t)
Z   !1  t!
i
H (t)
Dt   ! (1  t!
i)D (T   t)  !nt
H (t)

D
  (t)Z +  (t)Dt +  (t)
where ! = !i +!n, and is indeed equivalent to Z provided  (t) 6= 0, i.e., 1 t! 6= 0
for t in a neighborhood of 0. At t = 0, the condition is equivalent to, 1   0! 6=
0() !n    !i  D2 T +  2 6= 0. If the condition fails at t = 0, it holds at
t = 0+, so Z is immediately revealed in this case as well. Moreover, the pair (Z;D)
is a su¢ cient statistic, in equilibrium, for the PIPR and the conditional density of
the signal. This suggests that the pair is a su¢ cient statistic for the rest of the
equilibrium as well. This still needs to be veried.
Suppose that uninformed agents use FD;Z() to forecast the future dividend and
assess the price of risk m. In equilibrium, St = 
S
t 
m
t =
 
St
2
=    St t (Z;!),
which is a¢ ne with respect to the pair (Z;D). The volatility structure remains to
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be identied. Assuming volatility coe¢ cients are functions of time and simplifying
yields,
St = E
24DT   TZ
t
Ss ds
Fmt
35 = Dt + D(T   t) + DE hWDT  WDt FZ;Dt i
  1
 
TZ
t
 
Ss
2
ds+
TZ
t
E
h
Ss ((s)Z + (s)Ds + (s))
FZ;Dt i
= Dt + 
D(T   t)  1
 
TZ
t
 
Ss
2
ds+
TZ
t
Ss (s)ds+
0@ TZ
t
Ss(s)ds
1AZ
+DE
h
WDT  WDt
FZ;Dt i+ TZ
t
Ss (s)E
h
Dsj FZ;Dt
i
ds
 Dt +G0 (t; T )Z + bF  S; t+ DE hWDT  WDt FZ;Dt i
+
TZ
t
Ss  (s)E
h
DsjFZ;Dt
i
ds
where G0 (t; T ) =
R T
t
Ss (s) ds and bF  S; t = D (T   t)   (1= ) R Tt  Ss 2 ds +R T
t
Ss  (s) ds. Moreover,
E
24 TZ
t
DdWDs
FZ;Dt
35 =  (t; T )  Z   !i  Dt + D (T   t)  !n
=  (t; T )Z   !i (t; T )Dt    (t; T )
 
!iD (T   t) + !n
E
h
DsjFZ;Dt
i
= Dt + 
D (T   t) +  (t; s)  Z   !i  Dt + D (T   t)  !n
=
 
Dt + 
D (T   t)  1  !i (t; s)+  (t; s)Z   !n (t; s)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where  (t; s) =
!i(D)
2
(s t)
M(t)
, so that,
TZ
t
Ss (s)E
h
DsjFZ;Dt
i
ds = G1 (t; T )
 
Dt + 
D (T   t)+G2 (t; T )  Z   !n
G1 (t; T ) =
TZ
t
Ss (s)
 
1  !i(t; s) ds; G2 (t; T ) = TZ
t
Ss (s)(t; s)ds:
Hence,
St = Dt +G0 (t; T )Z + bF  S; t+  (t; T )Z   !i (t; T )Dt
  (t; T )  !iD (T   t) + !n+G1 (t; T )  Dt + D (T   t)
+G2 (t; T )
 
Z   !n
=
 
1  !i (t; T ) +G1 (t; T )

Dt + (G0 (t; T ) +  (t; T ) +G2 (t; T ))Z + bF  S; t
+
  !i (t; T ) +G1 (t; T )D (T   t)  ( (t; T ) +G2 (t; T ))!n
 A(t)Dt +B(t)Z + F (t)
where,
A(t) = 1  !i (t; T ) +G1 (t; T ) = 1  !i (t; T ) +
TZ
t
Ss (s)
 
1  !i(t; s) ds
B(t) = G0 (t; T ) +  (t; T ) +G2 (t; T ) =  (t; T ) +
TZ
t
Ss ( (s) + (s)(t; s)) ds
F (t) = bF  S; t+ (A (t)  1)D (T   t) 
0@B (t)  TZ
t
Ss (s) ds
1A!n:
An application of Itos lemma shows that St = A (t)
D. The volatility coe¢ cient is
deterministic as conjectured. This validates the construction of the equilibrium stock
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price to this stage. Substituting in the coe¢ cients above gives,
A(t) = 1  !i (t; T ) + D
0@ TZ
t
A (s) (s)
 
1  !i(t; s) ds
1A
B(t) =  (t; T ) + D
0@ TZ
t
A (s) ( (s) + (s)(t; s)) ds
1A
F (t) = bF  A (t)D; t+ (A (t)  1)D (T   t)  I (t)!n
I (t) = B (t)  D
TZ
t
A (s) (s) ds:
Inserting bF  A (t)D; t = D (T   t)  1
 
 
D
2 R T
t
A (s)2 ds+ D
R T
t
A (s)  (s) ds in
the last coe¢ cient and collecting terms leads to,
F (t) = A (t)D (T   t) 
 
D
2
 
TZ
t
A (s)2 ds+ D
TZ
t
A (s)  (s) ds  I (t)!n
I (t) =  (t; T ) + D
TZ
t
A (s)  (s) (t; s) ds:
In these expressions, with ! = !i + !n,
 (t) =
1  t!
H (t)
D;  (t) =  !1  t!
i
H (t)
D
 (t) =  ! (1  t!
i)D (T   t)  !nt
H (t)
D;  (t; s) =
!i
 
D
2
(s  t)
M (t)
:
Equilibrium exists if the backward Voltera equation,
A(t) = 1  !i (t; T ) + D
0@ TZ
t
A (s) (s)
 
1  !i (t; s) ds
1A ; A (T ) = 1 (1)
for the coe¢ cient A () has a solution. This issue is addressed in the next lemma.
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Lemma 24 The unique solution of the backward Voltera equation is
A (t) =

H (T )
H (t)
! 
M (T )
M (t)
1 !
with M (t) = (!i)2H (t) + (!n)2
 

2
and ! = !i + !n. Moreover, A (t) > 0 for t 2
[0; T ].
Proof of Lemma 24. With M (t) = (!i)2H (t) + (!n)2
 

2
, note that,
1  !i (t; T ) = 1  (!
i)
2  
D
2
(T   t)
M (t)
=
(!i)
2  

2
+ (!n)2
 

2
M (t)
 M (T )
M (t)
1  !i(t; s) =
(!i)
2
 
D
2
(T   s) +  2+ (!n)2  2
M (t)
=
M (s)
M (t)
:
Substituting in (1) and using the change of variables C(t) = A(t)M (t) leads to,
A(t) = 1  !i (t; T ) + D
0@ TZ
t
A (s) (s)
 
1  !i(t; s) ds
1A
=
M (T )
M (t)
+ D
0@ TZ
t
A (s) (s)
M (s)
M (t)
ds
1A
() A(t)M (t) = M (T ) + D
0@ TZ
t
A (s) (s)M (s) ds
1A
() C(t) = M (T ) + D
0@ TZ
t
C (s) (s)ds
1A
subject to the boundary conditionC(T )M (T ). Equivalently, dC (t) =  DC (t) (t)dt.
The solution is C (t) = M (T ) exp

D
R T
t
(s)ds

. Substituting,
 (t) =   !
H (t)
 
1  t!i

D =   !
H (t)
 
1  (!
i)
2
H (t)
M (t)
!
D
=  !D
 
1
H (t)
  (!
i)
2
M (t)
!
67
and performing the integration,
C (t) = M (T ) exp

!

log

H (T )
H (t)

  log

M (T )
M (t)

= M (T )

H (T )
H (t)
! 
M (T )
M (t)
 !
:
Substituting C(t) = A(t)M (t) and rearranging leads to the formula stated.
Proof of Remark 5. Fix !n and let !i ! 0 and !u ! 1   !n. This yields
sit = 
si (t; s) = 0; M si (t) = (!n)2
 

2
and,
Asi (t) =

H (T )
H (t)
!n
; Bsi(t) = D
0@ TZ
t
Asi (s)si (s) ds
1A (2)
F si(t) = Asi (t)D (T   t) 
 
D
2
 
TZ
t
Asi (s)2 ds+ D
TZ
t
Asi (s) si (s) ds (3)
si (t) =
D
H (t)
; si (t) =  !n 
D
H (t)
; si (t) =  !n
D (T   t)
H (t)
D: (4)
The formulas stated follow. If, in addition, !n ! 0, then si (t) = si (t) = M si (t) =
Zsi = 0 and Asi (t) = 1. The stock price and return components announced follow.
Note that A (t) < Asi (t) < 1 for t < T and A (T ) = Asi (T ) = 1. Therefore,
St < 
S;si
t < 
S;si;0
t = 
D for t < T . In the limit, limt!TSt = limt!T
S;si
t =
limt!T
S;si;0
t = 
D.
Proof of Remark 6. Fix !n and let !i ! 1  !n and !u ! 0. This yields
Asu (t) =
H (T )
H (t)
; Bsu (t) = su (t; T )+D
0@ TZ
t
Asu (s) (su (s) + su(s)su(t; s)) ds
1A
(5)
F su(t) = Asu (t)D (T   t) 
 
D
2
 
TZ
t
Asu (s)2 ds+D
TZ
t
Asu (s) su (s) ds !nIsu (t)
(6)
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Isu (t) = su (t; T ) + D
TZ
t
Asu (s) su (s)su (t; s) ds (7)
su (t) =
1  sut
H (t)
D; su (t) =  1  
su
t (1  !n)
H (t)
D; sut =
(1  !n)H (t)
M su (t)
(8)
su (t) =  (1  
su
t (1  !n))D (T   t)  !nsut 
H (t)
D (9)
su (t; s) =
(1  !n)  D2 (s  t)
M su (t)
(10)
and M su (t) = (1  !n)2H (t) + (!n)2  2. The formulas stated follow. If, in
addition, !n ! 0, then su (t) = su (t) = su (t) = 0, sut = 1 and,
Asu;0 (t) = Asu (t) =
H (T )
H (t)
; Bsu;0 (t) = Isu;0 (t) = su;0 (t; T ) =
 
D
2
(s  t)
H (t)
(11)
F su;0(t) = Asu (t)D (T   t) 
 
D
2
 
TZ
t
Asu (s)2 ds (12)
andM su;0 (t) = H (t). This gives the formulas announced. Volatility rankings follows
from Asu;0 (t) = Asu (t) < A (t) for all t < T and A (T ) = Asu (T ) = Asu;0 (T ) = 1.
Proof of Corollary 7. The proof follows from Lemmas 25 and 26.
Proof of Corollary 8. The proof follows from Corollary 7 and Lemmas 25 and 26.
Proof of Corollary 9. The proof follows from Corollary 8 and Lemma 25.
Proof of Corollary 10. Di¤erentiating with respect to the risk tolerance parameter
gives the results.
Proof of Corollary 11. The results regarding the impact of s follows fromCorollary
8 and Lemma 26. The results about  follow from the structure of the coe¢ cient
 (t).
The next auxiliary lemmas are used to derive comparative statics results. Proofs
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are straightforward, but long and tedious. See Detemple, Rindisbacher and Truong
(2014).
Lemma 25 The following holds,
@H (t)
@t
=    D2 < 0; @M (t)
@t
=
 
!i
2 @H (t)
@t
< 0
@t
@t
=
!i (!n)2
 

2
M (t)2
@H (t)
@t
< 0;
@ (t; s)
@t
=  !i  D2 M (s)
M (t)2
< 0
@A (t)
@t
=  A (t)
 
!
H (t)
+
(1  !) (!i)2
M (t)
!
@H (t)
@t
> 0
@ (t)
@t
=  (!
n)2
 

2
!t + (1  t!)M (t)
M (t)H (t)2
@H (t)
@t
D ? 0() 2t 7
1
!i!
@ (t)
@t
= !
(!n)4
 

4
+ 2 (!i)
2
H (t) (!n)2
 

2
M (t)2H (t)2
@H (t)
@t
D < 0
@ (t) =
!D
H (t)2
 
@t
@t
 
!iD (T   t)  !nH (t)
 !nt
 
D
2
+ (1  t!i)D
 

2
!
(
@ (t) > 0() 0  H (t) < H (t)+
@ (t) < 0() H+ < H (t) ; H
+ =
 b+pb2   4ac
2a
(13)
a = s2

s
 
D
2
 +
 

2
D

; b =  2s2  2 D  2 (14)
c =    2  2 D  2 ; s = !i
!n
(15)
@B (t)
@t
=  
 
!i
 
D
2
M (t)
+ D (t)
!
A(t) < 0:
Lemma 26 Let s = !i=!n and E (t) = s2H (t) +
 

2
. The following holds,
@A (t)
@s
=   (1  !)

H (T )
H (t)
! 
E (T )
E (t)
 ! 2s  2  D2 (T   t)
E (t)2
< 0
@ (t)
@s
=   s
2H (t) + (2s+ 1)
 

2
E (t)2
D ? 0() H (t) ? 2s+ 1
s2
 

2
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@ (t)
@s
= !
2s
 

2
E (t)2
D > 0
@ (t)
@s
= !
2s
 

2
D (T   t) 

 s2H (t) +  2
E (t)2
D ? 0
() 2s  2 D (T   t) ?  s2H (t) +  2:
@A (t)
@
=
@B (t)
@
=
@ (t)
@
=
@ (t)
@
= 0;
@ (t)
@
=  ! !
nt
H (t)
D
@F (t)
@
=  !  D2 TZ
t
s
A (s)
E (s)
ds  !nI (t) :
Proof of Corollary 12. Straightforward, but lengthy derivations lead to,
@m (t)
@t
=
2A (t) @A (t)  (t)  A (t)2 @ (t)
 (t)2
D
!u 
=
A (t)2
 (t)

2
@tA (t)
A (t)
  @ (t)
 (t)

D
!u 
@m (t)
@s
=
A (t)2
 (t)

2
@sA (t)
A (t)
  @s (t)
 (t)

D
!u 
2
@tA (t)
A (t)
  @ (t)
 (t)
=  2

!   1
2

(!n)2
 

2
M (t)H (t)
@H (t)
@t
2
@sA (t)
A (t)
  @s (t)
 (t)
= 2s
 

2 M (t)
E (t)2
(!n)2
 

2
 (t) + (!i)
2  

2
H (t)
M (T ) (!n)2 ()2
> 0
where  (t) =
 

2
+ !
 
D
2
(T   t).
Proof of Proposition 16. The informed investorsoptimization problem
U i = max
N it
E
24X iT   12 i
TZ
0
d


X i

t
FG0
35
st
dX it = N
i
tt

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

dt+ dWGt

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which is equivalent to (because dWGt is Brownian Motion with respect to dW
G
t )
max
N it
E
24xi0 + TZ
0
N itt

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

dt  1
2 i
TZ
0
 
N it
2
2tdt
35
then his optimal number of share is
N it =  
i t + 
Gjm
t (G)
t
The investor who chooses to self-managed his portfolio solves the problem
Uu ( u) = max
Nut
E
24XuT   12 u
TZ
0
d hXuit
Fm0
35
st
dXut = N
u
t t (tdt+ dWt)
Similarly to the informed investors problem
Nut ( 
u) =  u
t
t
The active fund portfolio is the maximizer of
U i;i = max
Nu;it
Ei
24  (XuT   xu0)| {z }
utility from compensation
  1
2q
TZ
0
d


Xu;i

t
FG0
35
where q is the fund managers risk taking level.
max
Nu;it
Ei
24  (XuT   xu0)| {z }
utility from compensation
  1
2q
TZ
0
d


Xu;i

t
FG0
35
max
Nu;it
E
24 TZ
0
Nu;it t

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

dt  1
2q
TZ
0
 
Nu;it
2
2tdt
35
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Nu;it =
q

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

t
Proof of Proposition 18. The investors face 2 options: self-manage or delegate
his wealth. The utility obtained from the rst option is
Uu ( u) = E
24XuT   12 u
TZ
0
d hXuit
Fm0
35 ; Nut ( u) =  u tt
Uu ( u) = E
24xu0 + TZ
0
Nut ( 
u)ttdt  1
2 u
TZ
0
(Nut ( 
u)t)
2
Fm0
35 ; Nut ( u) =  u tt
Uu ( u) = E
24xu0 +  u2
TZ
0
2tdt
Fm0
35 :
The utility obtained from the second option is
Uu;i ( u) = E

(1  )Xu;iT + xu0
Fm0  ; Nu;it = q

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

t
= E
24(1  )q TZ
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2
+ (1  )xu0 + xu0
Fm0
35 :
Therefore, he will manage his wealth by himself i¤
Uu ( u)  Uu;i ( u)
xu0 +
 u
2
E
24 TZ
0
2tdt
Fm0
35  xu0 + (1  )qE
24 TZ
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0
35
 u  2 (1  )q E
24 TZ
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0
35,E
24 TZ
0
2tdt
Fm0
35 :
Proof of Proposition 20. For each client the fund manager attracts with the
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contract ; he earn an extra utility
Ei
24  (XuT   xu0)| {z }
utility from compensation
  1
2q
TZ
0
d


Xu;i

t
FG0
35
= Ei
24 TZ
0
Nu;it t

t + 
Gjm
t (G)

dt  1
2q
TZ
0
 
Nu;it
2
2tdt
35
where Nu;it =
q

t+
Gjm
t (G)

t
1
2
2qEi
24 TZ
0


Gjm
t + 
2
dt
FG0
35
Because the mass of investors F
 
 u;

is attracted by the actively managed funds, the
manager choose the optimal investment management fee that maximizes his utility
max
2[0;1]
!uF
 
 u;
 1
2
2qEi
24 TZ
0


Gjm
t + 
2
dt
FG0
35
() max
2[0;1]
F
 
 u;

2:
First order condition
2F
 
 u;

+ 2f
 
 u;
 @ u;
@
= 0
we have
 u; = T = 2 (1  )q E
24 TZ
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0
35,E
24 TZ
0
2tdt
Fm0
35
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then
@ u;
@
= 2 (1  2) q E
24 TZ
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0
35,E
24 TZ
0
2tdt
Fm0
35
= 2 (1  2)  
u;
2 (1  )
=
1  2
(1  ) 
u;:
Hence, the rst order condition becomes
2F
 
 u;

= f
 
 u;
 2  1
(1  ) 
u;
2F
 
 u;

 u;f ( u;)
=  2 + 1
1  
 = 1  1
2
1
F( u;)
 u;f( u;)
+ 1
:
The second order condition is
2F
 
 u;

+ 2f
 
 u;
 @ u;
@
= 0
0 > 2

F
 
 u;

+ f
 
 u;
 @ u;
@

+2f
 
 u;
@ u;
@
2
+ 2

f 0
 
 u;
 @ u;
@
+ f
 
 u;
 @2 u;
@2

:
Substitute
@ u;
@
=
1  2
(1  ) 
u; and
@2 u;
@2
=  4  
u;
2 (1  )
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the second order condition becomes
0 > 2F
 
 u;

+
 
f
 
 u;

+ 2f 0
 
 u;
 1  2
(1  ) 
u;
+2f
 
 u;
 1  2
(1  ) 
u;
2
  22f   u;  u;
(1  ):
Proof of Proposition 21. Let rewrite the equation (4.1) as follows
qr =
F
 
 u;

 (2  1) f ( u;) (16)
 u; = 2 (1  )qr
where r = E
R T
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0 E hR T0 2tdtFm0 i. First, the managers
risk taking level cannot approach 0 because the equation (16) must hold. That
means 0 = limq!0
F( u;)
(2 1)f( u;) but
F( u;)
(2 1)f( u;) > 0 for all parameters. Thus,
there exists a lower bound qmin for the managers risk taking level. Similarly, the
managers risk taking level cannot approach 1 because in order for (16) to hold,
 ! 1
2
then F
 
 u;
 ! 0 or the active fund collapses. This is obviously sub-
optimal for the fund manager if he could choose the level of risk-taking. Thus, there
exists an upper bound qmax for the managers risk-taking level. In other words, the
necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist is q is bounded by [qmin; qmax] where
the form of qmin and qmax depend on the distribution F; the risk tolerance band
 u; 
u
and the signal G: Let the curve C be the set of pairs  ;  u; such that
F( u;)
(2 1)f( u;) =
 u;
2(1 ) : This set is continuous because F (:) is continuous. Then
along this curve, the value
F( u;)
(2 1)f( u;) is continuous, also max(;  u;)C
F( u;)
(2 1)f( u;) =
rqmax and min
(;  u;)C
F( u;)
(2 1)f( u;) = rqmin: By intermediate value theorem, for any
q 2 [qmin; qmax] ; there exists a pair
 
;  u;
  C, such that F( u;)
(2 1)f( u;) = qr. The
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condition (4.3) that ensures the threshold risk tolerance belongs to its domain

 u; 
u
is automatically satised because of the denitions of qmin and qmax.
Proof of Proposition 22. Even though the quantities t and 
Gjm
t (G) are en-
dogenous in general equilibrium, the ratio r =
E
R T
0

t+
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0 
E[
R T
0 
2
tdtjFm0 ] is still bounded.
Easy to see that it is bounded below by 1: To show that it is bounded above, we
can note that investorsrisk tolerance range is bounded, so the market price of risk
2t is always bounded below (In fact, the market price of risk reaches 0 only if the
public overall risk tolerance approaches1; i.e. they are risk neutral) and the private
information price of risk Gjmt (G) is bounded above because of the noise  contained
in the signal G (Gjmt (G) goes to 1 i¤ the private signal has no noise, i.e  = 0)
Therefore, same argument as in Proof of Proposition 21 applies
Proof of Proposition 23. We have shown in the previous section that any
investment management fee  will split the investor population into two separate
groups, the group with high risk tolerance (i.e.  u   u;) will manage their own
portfolios and the remaining investors with low risk tolerance (i.e.  u   u;) will
invest in the active managed fund.
Dene
F ( ) 
 Z
 u
f ( u) d u and E ( ) 
 
uZ
 
 uf ( u) d u:
First, we solve for the equilibrium prices where the investment fee  and the threshold
risk tolerance   are determined exogenously. Hence, the total demand of shares from
the rst group is
N1t = !
u
 Z
 u
Nu;if ( u) d u =
 Z
 u
q
t + 
Gjm
t (G)
t
f ( u) d u
= !uF ( )q
t + 
Gjm
t (G)
t
:
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While the total demand of shares from the second group is
N2t = !
u
 
uZ
 
Nu ( u) f ( u) d u = !u
 
uZ
 
 ut
t
f ( u) d u = !uE ( )
t
t
:
The representative informed investors and the noise traders demand are
!iN i = !i i
t + 
Gjm
t (G)
t
and !nNn = !n
t + 
Gjm
t ()
t
:
The market clearing condition imposes
Ndemandt = N
supply
t
!uF ( )q
t + 
Gjm
t (G)
t
+ !uE ( )
t
t
+ !i i
t + 
Gjm
t (G)
t
+ !n n
t + 
Gjm
t ()
t
= 1:
Conjecture that the function Gjmt (x) is a¢ ne function of x; then the market clearing
condition gives
t =
t   Gjmt ((!uqF ( ) + !i i)G+ !n n)
!u 
q
F ( ) + !uE ( ) + !i i +  n!n
:
Hence, information revealed in equilibrium includes the noisy translation of the pri-
vate signal Z  (!uqF ( ) + !i i)G+ !n n:
Dene wu  !uE ( ) ; wi  (!uqF ( ) + !i i), wn  !n n; W =wu + wi + wn
then Z = wiG+ wn and
t =
t   Gjmt (Z;wi; wn)
W
:
We have Fmt  FZ;Dt :
The new Brownian motion with respect to the public information ltration Fmt is
dened as dWmt  dWDt   mjDt dt and the new Brownian motion with respect to the
private information ltration FGt is dened as dWGt  dWmt   Gjmt dt: Suppose that
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Fmt = FZ;Dt ; we obtain

mjD
t =
wiD
w2iHt + w
2
n
2

(Z   wi (Dt + D (T   t)))

Gjm
t (G) =
D
Ht
(G Dt   D (T   t)) 
wiD
Mt
(Z   wi (Dt + D (T   t))) :
Hence, Gjmt (x) is a¢ ne in x; as conjectured.
Compute Gjmt (Z;wi; wn):

Gjm
t (Z;wi; wn) = wi
Gjm
t (G) + wn
Gjm
t ()
=
D
Ht
Z + wi
0@ DHt ( D   D (T   t))
 wiD
Mt
(Z   wi (D + D (T   t)))
1A
+wn
0@ DHt ( D   D (T   t))
 !iD
Mt
(Z   wi (D + D (T   t)))
1A
=  (t)Z +  (t)Dt + t:
The informational content in Gjmt (Z;wi; wn) is indeed equivalent to Z provided
 (t) 6= 0: The pair (Z;D) is a su¢ cient statistic for the PIPR. We still need to
verify that the pair is a su¢ cient statistic for the rest of the equilibrium as well.
Assume the public investor use FD;Z to forecast future dividend and assess the market
price of risk t as follow
t =
t   Gjmt (wiG+ wn)
W
=
t   ( (t)Z +  (t)Dt + t)
W
where
 (t)  DMt   wiHt (wi + wn)
HtMt
 (t)  D
  Mt + w2iHt wi + wnHtMt
 (t)  DD
  Mt + w2iHt (wi + wn) T   tHtMt
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and the expected stock return t is
t =
2t   t ( (t)Z +  (t)Dt + t)
W
:
Assuming the volatility coe¢ cients are functions of time, it follows that the stock
price will be
St = Dt + D (T   t) 
1
W
TZ
t
2sds+
1
W
TZ
t
s (sZ + s) ds
+E
24 TZ
t
DdWDs
FZ;Dt
35+ 1
W
TZ
t
ssE
h
DsjFZ;Dt
i
ds
where E
hR T
t
DdWDs
FZ;Dt i is equal to
E
24 TZ
t
DdWDs
FZ;Dt
35 =  (t; T )Z   wi (t; T )Dt    (t; T )  wiD (T   t)
and E
h
DsjFZ;Dt
i
is equal to
E
h
DsjFZ;Dt
i
=
 
Dt + 
D (T   t)  1  wi (t; s)+  (t; s)Z
with
 (t; s)  wi
2
D (s  t)
Mt
Combining the above expressions, we obtain the stock price is
St = AtDt +BtZ + Ft
where
At  1  wi (t; T ) + 1W
TZ
t
ss (1  wi (t; s)) ds
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Bt   (t; T ) + 1W
TZ
t
s (s + s (t; s)) ds
Ft = D (T   t) 
1
W
TZ
t
2sds+
1
W
TZ
t
ssds
  (t; T ) (wiD (T   t))
+
1
W
TZ
t
ss ((D (T   t)) (1  wi (t; s))) ds
From Itos lemma , the stock volatility is t = AtD; then At; and Bt and Ft can be
rewritten as
At = 1  wi (t; T ) + DW
TZ
t
Ass (1  wi (t; s)) ds
Bt =  (t; T ) +
D
W
TZ
t
As (s + s (t; s)) ds
Ft = AtD (T   t) 
2D
W
TZ
t
A2sds+
D
W
TZ
t
Assds
Therefore, the stock volatility is deterministic as conjectured, and the pair (Z;D) is
a su¢ cient statistic for the stock price. This conrms Fmt = FZ;Dt
The equilibrium exists if the backward Voltera equation
At = 1  wi (t; T ) + DW
TZ
t
Ass (1  wi (t; T )) ds
for the coe¢ cient A(:) has a solution. The next Lemma gives
At =

HT
Ht
w
W

MT
Mt
1 wW
Therefore, given any pair (; ), the equilibrium coe¢ cients are E(; )t ; 
E(; )
t and
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
Gjm;E(; )
t : In competitive NREE, the fund manager and investors actions cannot
a¤ect the equilibrium prices. The equilibrium investment management fee  and the
threshold risk tolerance  u; are the xed points of the system of two equations
 = 1  1
2
1
F( u;)
 u;f( u;)
+ 1
 u; = 2 (1  )q E
24 TZ
0

t + 
Gjm
t (G)
2Fm0
35,E
24 TZ
0
2tdt
Fm0
35
and
1
2
<  < max
x2[ u; u]
 
1  1
2
1
F (x)
 u;f(x)
+ 1
!
:
Lemma 27 The unique solution of the backward Voltera equation is
At =

HT
Ht
w
W

MT
Mt
1 wW
:
Moreover, A (t) > 0 for t 2 [0; T ] :
Proof. The equation
At = 1  wi (t; T ) + DW
TZ
t
Ass (1  wi (t; T )) ds
can be written as
AtMt = MT +
D
W
TZ
t
AssMsds
Dene Ct  AtMt with the boundary condition CT = MT and dCt =  DW Cttdt
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where
Ct = M (T ) exp
0@D
W
TZ
t
sds
1A
= M (T ) exp
0@ 1
W
TZ
t

 
2
D
Hs
+
2D!
2
i
Ms

ds
1A
Hence the solution can be written as
At =

HT
Ht
w
W

MT
Mt
1 wW
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